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In Asia, the studies on mergers and takeovers are still very scarce. With the rise of 
financial crisis in 1997, there has been an increase of corporate takeovers and 
mergers. In the light of other relevant empirical literature on the subject from 
different established equity markets, the study is made to determine the effects of 
acquisition announcements on the price behavior of the Asian bidding and target 
firms. The objective of the study is to provide a reference for investors about 
whether the firms concerned experienced abnormal return around M&A 
announcements in Asia (no matter whether M&A activities were completed or not) 
and how type of acquisitions, mode of payment and form of target firms affected 
abnormal return of the companies. It makes use of information about mergers or 
acquisitions announcement over the period from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 
1998 in the Extel Database CD-ROM 1998 and Reuter Business Database 1998 in 
Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Japan. There are 45 
mergers and 513 acquisitions for the overall sample in which 123 public (target) 
firms and 435 private (target) firms are involved. Cash is the major payment method 
in the entire sample.
The results indicate that information concerning a forthcoming corporate takeover is 
considered good news for the shareholders of bidding firms but not regarded as good 
news for the shareholders of the target firms because only shareholders of bidding 
firms can enjoy significant cumulative average abnormal return around the 
announcement period but the cumulative average abnormal return shown at the table 
4 for target firms is negative statistically insignificant. The findings are contrary to a 
lot of previous studies concerned (see Chang (1998), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Asquith and Kim (1982), Dodd and Ruback (1977)). The study also finds that 
abnormal return of shareholders of bidding firms and target firms at the 
announcement period is not function of type of acquisition, form of target firms and 
mode of payment. The findings are different from those of Suk and Sung (1997) and 
Travlos and Papaioannou (1991), Jensen and Ruback (1983).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
There are a number of merger and acquisition activities in Asia. This thesis focuses 
on mergers and acquisitions (M&A), in particular the firms involved, in Asia. 
Specially, it examines abnormal returns of companies around M&A announcement 
period and factors affecting those abnormal returns. From existing studies, there are 
no consensus that bidding firms and target firms involved in M&As, experienced 
abnormal returns around the M&A announcement period. Besides, there is limited 
evidence on the causes of the variation of returns during the announcement period. It 
is indeterminate whether various factors such as types of acquisition, modes of 
payment and types of target firms would affect abnormal returns to the shareholders. 
However, it is important for the public to know because there is considerable concern 
about the effects of the type of acquisitions, payment form and type of target firms on 
the shareholder wealth. The study of these aspects could yield an insight into the 
strategic decision-making process surrounding an acquisition.
Franks et al. (1985) defined a merger as a corporate combination of two or more 
firms as a result of an arrangement between the management teams of the companies 
involved. A holding company may be set up as a result of the merger and so the 
stockholders of both companies involved could offer the holding company securities 
in exchange for their existing stocks. An acquisition occurs when one company 
acquires a sufficient proportion of another company’s share. The shares could be 
purchased on the stock market or acquired through a tender offer directly made to the
shareholders of the target firm.
In various Asian markets, the development of mergers and acquisitions is still in an
early stage. Although there have been many M&A deals concerning Asian enterprises, 
very few researchers have empirically investigated whether M&A activities can create 
value to shareholders. From 1990 to 1995, there were approximately 173 Asian 
M&A deals in the US and the amount involved was over US$ 9,000 million. The top 
target industries in 1995 were financial and real estate, metals and minerals, energy 
and water supply and electronics and services.1 In the same period, there were 475 
deals in Europe and the amount was over US$ 21,600 million. The top target 
industries were financial and real estate, electronics, agriculture and food, and hotels 
and distribution.2 In 1995, the total amount of the US and European M&A activities 
in Japan was over US$380 million, US$ 330 million in China, US$ 298 million in 
Taiwan, US$ 400 million in Hong Kong, US$ 70 million in South Korea and US$60 
million 3 in Singapore.
1.1 Objectives
There were a lot of M&A activities in Asia especially at the second half of the 1990s. 
After the Asian financial crisis, most Asian governments encouraged the mergers and 
acquisitions of companies to raise competitiveness and reduce cost. Risk reduction 
and acquiring undervalued assets were reasons for bidding firms to launch takeovers.
The objectives of this study are to examine whether M&A announcements cause 
abnormal return to shareholders of companies concerned and to investigate factors 
affecting abnormal return of companies involved.
1 The 1996 guide to Asian M&A Professionals and Corporate Development Officers. Asia M&A
Reporter 1996 p.18
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To elaborate, the objectives of the research paper are divided into two major areas:
1. To examine whether the firms involved in M&A would experience abnormal 
returns around the M&A announcement period
2. To test factors affecting abnormal returns; including:
• To test whether the abnormal returns of bidding firms and target firms is a 
function of type of acquisition (Type of acquisition includes merger and acquisition)
• To test whether the abnormal returns of bidding firms is dependent on the type of 
target firms (Type of target firms is defined as whether target firms were public or 
private firms)
• To test whether the abnormal returns of bidding firms and target firms is 
dependent on the mode of payment (Mode of payment includes cash and share).
The study is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the relevant literature. 
Chapters III and IV discuss, respectively, background information and methodology 
of this study. Chapter V contains a discussion of the results. Implications and 
conclusion are presented in Chapters VI and VII. The last chapter concludes with 
some limitations of the study.
1.2 Significance of the Study
Merger and acquisition activities in North American and European markets have been 
developing for over four decades before reaching a mature stage. As such there have 
been a lot of studies about the effects of M&A announcements, on the other hand,
ib id .
ib id .  p. 2 2
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there were very few studies on M&As and their resulting abnormal returns in Asia. 
Frank et al. (1991) found no evidence to support significant abnormal returns of 
acquiring firms over a three-year period after the bid date. Langetieg (1978) and 
Agrawal et al. (1992) concluded that bidding firms lost from the acquisitions over 
several years, but Ruback (1977), Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978) and Dodd (1980) 
indicated that bidding firms gained from the acquisitions. Therefore, the answer to 
the research question ‘who will gain and who will lose in the M&A game’ was 
ambiguous. The significance of this study is to provide answers to the following areas 
with the hope that they have important implications to all those involved in the M&A 
game in Asia -  whether they are corporate decision makers or shareholders.
Firstly, M&A activities have not only captured the interest and attention of a broad 
segment of the community but have also attracted the scrutiny of governments. The 
reasons are: economic power might be more concentrated because of takeover
activities; investment in the stock market is becoming more popular; and shareholders 
knowledge about the market is increasing.
Secondly, small investors are often in a dilemma when they are forced to decide 
whether or not to dispose of their shares in the face of a bid as they do not know the 
gain-loss circumstances of game. By the same token, managers of a target company 
do not know the profit, if any, of a bid. Preferences of bidding and target firm 
managers for control rights motivate the form of payment in an acquisition. For 
instance, Ghosh and Ruland (1998) found that managers of target firms were more 
likely to choose stock offer rather than cash in order to keep their jobs in combined 
firms.
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1.3 Scope of Research
This study covers all merger and acquisition deals affecting public firms in China, 
Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan during the 1990s, 
irrespective of whether they are successful or not. These cities or countries are 
chosen because they are major economic zones with substantial influence in Asia. 
Japan is the biggest economy in Asia and the volume of M&As there is the highest. In 
1995, over 80% of deals in which Asian buyers acquired US firms were launched by 
Japanese. The value involved was over US$ 55 billion. The Japanese M&A boom 
started from 1987 to 1992. It first began in the US and then expanded to Europe.4 
The number of M&A activities and values involved in other major Asian countries 
have increased consequently.
4 The 1996 guide to Asian M&A Professionals and Corporate Development Officers. Asia M&A 
Reporter 1996 p. 17 & 23
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This section reviews the literature regarding M&A studies from the 1970s to the 
1990s to give some background information about the present.
2.1 Abnormal Return around the Announcement of M&A
Dodd and Ruback (1977) analyzed abnormal returns around the time of a takeover 
announcement and showed both target and bidding firms shareholders would earn 
positive and significant gain from a successful takeover. For successful offers, about 
20 percent of target firms stockholders and three percentage of bidding firms 
stockholders would earn abnormal return in the month of announcement. Whereas 
for unsuccessful offers, 19 percent of target firm stockholders would gain but there 
was no loss for the bidding firms.
Franks et al. (1977) estimated the gain to shareholders from 71 mergers in Britain 
from 1955 to 1972. They found that target firm shareholders gained 26% abnormal 
return on average over a period of three months prior to the announcement of a 
merger but bidding firm shareholders gained only 2.5% abnormal return. Langetieg 
(1978) measured shareholder gains from merger and employed the effective date of 
final approval by target shareholders as the event date. Post-merger excess returns 
were found to be insignificantly different from zero and positive pre-merger excess 
returns were too small to conclude that welfare increase of stockholders was the only 
motive for mergers. Managerial welfare gain might be seen as an instrumental reason
6
for mergers. On average, the bidding firms and target firms had abnormal returns of
6% and 13% respectively.
Mat-Nor (1993) examined the effect of acquisition announcement on the security 
prices of bidding and target firms in Malaysia. He concluded that there had been an 
increase of corporate takeovers and mergers since the introduction of the new 
economic policy in 1970. He used daily common stock returns of the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange for 200 days before and 200 days after the acquisition 
announcement. The study found both a significant negative change on bidders after 
the announcement and an overestimation of the bidders on their future efficiency of 
the gains from the merger.
Mandelkr (1974) examined risk and return in the case of merger by using a two-factor 
market model. He concluded that stockholders of both the acquiring and the 
acquired firms would earn abnormal return and proved the perfectly competitive 
acquisition market hypothesis: the market is independent of information on 
acquisition. However, there were restrictions to his result, for instance, eighty-five 
percent of acquired firms in his sample were delisted in the month of the merger. 
Also, he selected his announcement dates as the effective date of merger, so the 
market reaction in the month of merger for acquired firms cannot be identified.
Asquith and Kim (1982) examined return to common stock return of target firms 
around the date of the initial announcement or completion of a merger. They tested 
the impact of merger bids on the wealth of the participating firms5 security holders 
and concluded that target firms stockholders gained but bidding firms stockholders
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did not. The results showed that a conflict of interest between stockholders and 
bondholders could be resolved by an efficient market.
Asquith (1983) measured the impact of merger bids on stock returns and found, in 
some cases, that leakage of information prior to the initial announcement and 
uncertainty of the outcome of a proposed merger were not resolved at the initial 
announcement. The major gainers were target firms’ stockholders but there were no 
losers in the game.
According to hubris hypothesis (see Roll 1986), excess premium paid for the target 
company benefited the acquired firm’s shareholders, so shareholders of the acquiring 
company suffered a decrease in wealth. An overpayment made by bidding firms was a 
result of personal goals of management rather than a maximization of shareholder 
wealth. The hubris hypothesis would predict market price movements in bidding firms 
as follows:
• A price declined on announcement of a bid
• A price increased on abandoning a bid or on losing a bid; and
• A price declined on actually winning a bid.
Similarly, Roll (1986) indicated that there was an increase in target firms5 share prices 
in merger announcements. When bids were given up, the price declined by 8% on 
average. If the market expected no other bids would arrive, larger decreases were 
observed. Jarrell (1989) observed that shareholders of bidding firms experienced 
small but statistically significant cumulative average return (CAR) at the 
announcement of tender offers, whilst that of target firms received even larger CAR.
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Besides, the use of a poison pill showed a negative effect on share price. Poison pill 
referred to force the potential bidder into negotiating directly with the board of 
directors. The board kept the ability to redeem the rights for certain amount. Thus, 
the poison pill put power in the hands of the board of directors to dissuade a 
takeover, which might or might not be in the best interest of shareholders overall.
As shown above, it is uncertain about the distribution of gain of shareholders of 
bidding firms but clear that target firms benefit as a result of takeover. It is worth 
investigating this aspect.
2.2 Mode of Payment
Ghosh and Ruland (1998) investigated how bidding and target firms managers’ 
preferences for control rights motivated the form of payment for corporate 
acquisitions. To elaborate, managers of target firms were more likely to keep their 
jobs in combined firms when they received stock rather than cash. They indicated that 
managerial ownership of target firms was even more important than that of bidding 
firms in explaining the method of payment. Jensen (1986) found that target firms with 
excess cash flow would lure a bidding firm to use cash to finance acquisitions. 
Bidding firms' management preferred using free cash flow to expand under their 
control rather than returning excess of the amount required to finance projects.
Wansley et al. (1983) found that the length of processing time was crucial to the 
choice between a cash offer and a stock offer. In a stock offer, a bidding firm had to 
obtain approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US before
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target firm shareholders begin to tender their shares. This process could take months 
as opposed to weeks only in a cash offer. Longer processing time for a stock offer 
gave target management a better opportunity to implement a defense. Meanwhile, 
abnormal returns of shareholders of target firms in cash acquisitions were twice the 
amount of share offers.
Travlos and Papaioannou (1991) examined effects of the method of payment on 
bidding firms' stock return at the initial announcement of takeover bids. Generally, 
cash offers generated higher abnormal returns than stock exchange offers. Bidding 
firm shareholders on the announcement day earned , on average, -1.3% and -0.8% 
abnormal return for stock exchange and cash offers respectively. On the second day 
after the announcement, the bidding firm shareholders earned -2.55% and 0.9% 
abnormal return for stock exchange and cash offer respectively. Whether the outlay 
was in cash or common stock, the firm could attempt to allocate capital optimally to 
raise shareholder wealth over the long run in either offer.
Asquith et al. (1983) found that abnormal returns earned by bidders increased when 
target size increased relative to acquirer size. If the bidders financed the offer with an 
equity issue, positive announcement effects from the takeover could be offset by 
information released in the financing decision. Thus, the stock price returns to 
acquiring firms were significantly lower than in cash offers.
To sum up, processing time, management preference and shareholders interest were 
critical reasons for bidding firms to choose the mode of payment. Different modes of 
payment caused different abnormal return. Therefore, the study testified whether
10
mode o f payment would create influence on abnormal return.
2.3 Type of Acquisition
Some argued that the cost of acquiring firms was a crucial reason for the choice 
between a merger and a tender offer. The cost of acquiring a firm was related to the 
control premium required by target management. A premium for control needed to 
be offered when target management’s shareholdings were enough to block the 
transfer of control.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed 13 studies concerning abnormal returns around 
takeover announcements. They indicated the effects of takeover regulation and 
summarized the reasons for managerial actions to corporate control that were harmful 
to stockholders. They found an average excess return of 30% to target stockholders 
in successful tender offers and 20% to target stockholders in successful mergers. 
Bidding firm stockholders gained an average of 4% around tender offers and no 
abnormal return around the merger.
Suk and Sung (1997) looked at the effects of the method of payment, form of 
acquisition and type of offer on target abnormal returns around the takeover 
announcement, controlling for the target firm's institutional ownership. These results 
were inconsistent with both the tax hypothesis and the information effect hypothesis. 
Both tax hypothesis and the information effect hypothesis provided the same 
prediction that cash offers generated higher premiums and higher target abnormal 
returns than stock exchange offers. Bidders would pay more to acquire target to
11
compensate tax expense faced by target firm. Bidders had more information about 
their firms. If they found that their stock price was overvalued, they acquired target 
firms with stock offers. This stock offer would signal markets that stock price of 
bidders was overvalued and then this caused the stock price of bidders to decrease. 
On the other hand, if bidders recognized that their stock prices were undervalued, 
they would not choose stock offer as a mode of payment in the M&A deal. They 
would prefer cash offer. Provide that bidders knew more about target firms and 
found that it was very profitable to acquire target firms, they offered a higher 
acquiring price. However, their result showed that there was no difference in 
premiums between stock exchange offers and cash offers. There was no relation 
between bid premium and institutional ownership of the target firm in cash offers. If 
the tax effect was important, premiums would be negatively correlated with the 
institutional ownership of target firms in cash offers. If the information effect was 
crucial in explaining abnormal return of target at announcement period, cash offers 
should yield higher premiums than stock exchange offer. Also, the result found that 
target returns of tender offers were significantly higher than those of mergers after 
controlling the method of payment. The evidence suggested the likelihood of future 
competition might be higher in tender offers than in mergers.
2.4 Type of Target Firm
Chang (1998) examined bidder returns at the announcement of a takeover proposal 
when target firms were privately held. He indicated that bidders experienced no 
abnormal return in cash offer but a positive abnormal return in stock offer. The 
findings were in contrast to typical results. The monitoring activities and information
12
asymmetries were reasons for positive wealth effect: bidders experienced a positive 
abnormal return in stock offers. The positive wealth effect is related to monitoring 
activities by target shareholders and, to an extent, reduced information asymmetries. 
Acquiring private target firm with a stock offer, blockholders were created to 
monitor performance of the new holding company. It strengthened monitoring on the 
operation of the company and more information was reported to the shareholders. 
As there were limited studies about whether type of target firm was a vital factor to 
investors5 abnormal return around M&A announcement, the study tried to prove this 
point.
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Chapter 3: Background of Research
This chapter describes three aspects, namely economic environment, government 
influence and legal environment in order to provide a more solid background of the 
study
3.1 Economic Environment.
In the first half of the 1990s, rapid economic growth was observed in Taiwan, 
Singapore, South Korea, China and Hong Kong where firms initiated a wave of M&A 
activities. From 1990 to 1995, the growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product on 
average in China was 11%, Hong Kong 5% , Taiwan 7%, Singapore 9% and South 
Korea 7% .5 The high economic growth rate and increasing stock market values 
generated pools of capital within Asian countries. Capital accumulation created a 
driving force throughout the region. There was a wave of Japanese both cross-border 
and domestic M&A activities.
Since 1990, the Chinese authority had accelerated its reform of economic policy and 
launched a series of program to stimulate the economic growth such as mergers and 
acquisitions of state owned enterprises. The cases of M&A increased globally because 
firms wanted to reduce their costs and increase their competitiveness. For example, 
the Charoen Pokphand Group sold its Thai supermarket chain, Lotus to Britain Tesco 
and South Korean Mando Machinery Corp. sold its holdings in Korea Automotive 
Motor Corp. to Germany Bosch, (see Islam 1998)
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3.2 Government Influence
After the Asian financial crisis, most Asian governments encouraged mergers and 
acquisitions to increase competitiveness and to reduce costs. According to Deputy 
Prime Minister Lee of Singapore in a bid to strengthen its financial sector, the 
government was adopting an approach to encourage but not force its domestic banks 
to merge to create more internationally competitive groups.* 6 Similarly, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission of South Korea encouraged mergers to restructure its 
banking sector which was saddled with about HK$628.9 billion of bad loans. Two
top commercial banks in South Korea- Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank -
responded to government pressure to reform by launching a merger that created 
Korea's biggest bank. In addition, the South Korean government offered new services 
catering to foreign investors and slashed a tangle of bureaucracy.7
Thus, hostile takeovers of domestic enterprises by foreign companies became legal 
whilst most restrictions on foreign ownership of real estates were to be abolished. 
Japanese parliament approved legislation broadening the scope of the nation's deposit 
insurance law to encourage weak banks to merge.8 All these reflected that the 
increasing trend of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Asian under various 
financial difficulties faced by Asian companies.
• Datastream
6 Chan, P. Mergers Encouraged to Strengthen Bank Base. South China Morning Post 10th 
August, 1998 : 6
7 Korean Banks Come to Terms with Mergers. South China Morning Post 4th August, 1998: 5
8 Parliament Approves Mergers. South China Morning Post 13lh December, 1997: 4
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In China, mergers and acquisitions were considered effective means to improve its 
efficiency and productivity of enterprises, especially for shaping capital and 
technology-intensive industries, for example, airlines, petroleum engineering and 
petrochemical sectors, etc. Four large-scale chemical enterprises in Nanjing - Jinling 
Petrochemicals, Yangzi Petrochemicals, Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co and Nanjing 
Chemical Fibre Co - merged into a powerful conglomerate with both the central and 
local governments’ encouragement.9
Merger was an increasingly popular strategy in several Taiwanese industries such as 
steel, airlines and banking. An Feng’s merger with Australia's Kingstream and 
Taisheng Steel buying Chi Shun Hwa Steel were good examples.10 The Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) of Taiwan encouraged financial institutions keen on making inroads 
into brokerage and bills finance to merge with existing companies rather than set up 
their own, as the market became saturated.
9 Capener, C. R. (1996). A Guidebook to Mergers and Acquisitions in China. Asia Information 
Association Limited.
10 “Mergers Today” Taiwan Business News: 14th August, 1997
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3.3 Legal Environment
3.3.1 Hong Kong Securities Legislation
The Companies Ordinance, Securities Ordinance and Protection of Investors 
Ordinance are three major ordinances to govern the way takeovers and mergers occur 
in Hong Kong. Companies Ordinance deals with contents of prospectuses and the 
issue of share. The Securities Ordinance and Protection of Investors Ordinance were 
enacted in 1974. The former regulates dealings in securities and the activities of 
dealers whilst the latter makes it an offense to make any false statements, promise or 
forecast in certain circumstance in documents relating to mergers and takeovers.
3.3.2 Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mereers
The Securities and Futures Commission is responsible for reviewing the Hong Kong 
Code on takeover and mergers concerning general housekeeping improvements, the 
administration of the Code, and the enforcement provisions and the sanctions backing 
the Code.
The Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers was set up in August 1975 with 
several amendments afterwards. The most current Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
in Hong Kong is on April 2000. According to the Code of 1990s’ version, the 
trigger point remained at 35% of the voting rights of a company and the annual 
creeper was at 5% of the voting rights of a company in any 12-month periods.11 It is a 
voluntary code without legal sanctions and , in certain respects, it is similar to the
Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Hong Kong Government Publication, October 1998
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London Code. The Code consists of 10 general principles and 37 rules. Two major 
themes run through the provisions of the Code:
• It is for the offeree shareholders to decide whether or not an offer shall succeed.
• There must be equitable treatment between the various shareholders of the 
offeree company.
The most important point in the whole Code is the definition of control.
“control shall be deemed to mean a holding , or aggregate holdings of 
share carrying 35% or more of the voting rights of a company 
irrespective of whether that holding or holdings gives de facto control.
However, the Code has not specified that those breaching the rules risk 
having the facilitates of the securities market withdrawn from them.
Thus, it has been criticized for its shortage of statutory power. For those 
breaching their rules, Hong Kong code simply threatens private 
reprimand or public censure of fiirther action as appropriate” 12
12 ibid
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3.3.3. Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers
In Singapore, there was a statutory scheme regulating takeover before the Singapore 
Code existed. The Singapore Code is issued by Minister of Finance and 
administrated by the Securities Industry Council (SIC). SIC has statutory recognition 
and its functions are consultation and supervision. The breach of the Singapore Code 
is not a criminal offence. The trigger point remains 20% 13. Due to a lack of 
information in the 1990s, it was uncertain whether there were changes on the trigger 
point.
3.3.4 Taiwan Securities Legislation
In Taiwan, merger cases must be reviewed by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) and 
comply with the Fair Trade Law.14 FTC can shut down integrating businesses if they 
do not apply to FTC on a merger that results in a new entity taking over one-third of 
the total market share. Also, any merger involving a firm with a corner on more than 
one-fourth of its corresponding market must be reviewed.
The Securities and Exchange Commission implements rules whereby any investor or 
enterprise that amassed one-third of a targeted firms.15 There are now over 1,300 
companies in Taiwan offering shares to the public. The merger and acquisition 
actions must be carried out on the open market outside the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
and the over-the-counter stock market. After receiving notice from a corporate 
raider, the targeted firm must make public the potential merger action within 10 days 
and notify major shareholders with over 1,000 shares within 15 days. The
13 Chandrasegar，C. (1988) Corporate Take-overs in the United Kingdom, Singapore and Hong 
K ong,Singapore Longman
14 The Asialaw Guide to Mergers & Acquisition ， Asia Law & Practice Ltd, 1998
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acquisitions should be completed within 20 to 60 days. The acquirers are not allowed 
to take action against the same target firm within one year after a failing attempt has 
failed. Those failing to comply with the new rules are subject to jail terms ranging 
from one to seven years.
3.3.5 South Korea Securities Legislation
Any listed company who engages in M&A deals must file the materials prescribed by 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule. Any person who acquires more 
than 5% of the voting shares of a listed company has to report the information to the 
SEC within 5 days of the acquisition subject to Securities Exchange Act (SEA).15 6 
The SEA sets a ceiling on the number of shares (55%) which an individual foreigner 
and foreigners in the aggregate are permitted to acquire.
In order to receive the International Monetary Fund rescue package after the 1997 
financial crisis, South Korea was forced to make substantial changes regarding its 
economic structure including rules on mergers and acquisition. 17 The mandatory 
tender offer rule was abolished entirely and cross-guarantees among group companies 
were eliminated over the coming years. The requirement that a prospective buyer 
obtain the target's board approval, however, remains the biggest regulatory obstacle 
to foreign takeovers. The trigger point was increased to 33% from 10%. An 
acquirer may become the largest shareholder by acquiring up to 33% of a target 
without target’s board approval. Thus, there is a trend toward the abolition of all
15 The Asialaw Guide to Mergers & Acquisition ， Asia Law & Practice Ltd, 1998
16 Tomsett, Eric G., Bater, Paul and Daiber, Claudia (1996) The International Guide to Mergers and 
Acquisitions. International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.
17 The Asialaw Guide to Mergers & Acquisition ， Asia Law & Practice Ltd, 1998
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barriers to foreign acquisitions of Korean companies such that M&A becomes easier 
for foreigners.
The SEA requires any entity which holds a stake of 5% or any holding change of 1% 
or more in a listed company to report its holding to Korea Stock Exchange and 
Korea Stock Exchange Commission within five days of its holding.
3.3.6 Japan Securities Legislation
In Japan, mergers are dealt with the Japanese Commercial Code. There are no 
specific limitations on the acquisition of shares of a Japanese corporation under the 
Commercial Law.18 The transfer of shares subject to the approval of the board of 
directors, but not governed by Code of mergers and acquisitions. Any M&A deals 
not related to foreign (not-resident companies) buyers are not necessarily to subject 
to the government approvals, whilst acquisitions of shares by non-residents must be 
notified to the Government through the Bank of Japan.19
3.3.7 China Securities Legislation
All M&A deals in China are subject to government approvals.20 The State Council 
possesses legislative control over approvals for M&A transactions and delegates the 
authority to Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). 
Asset acquisition through wholly owned companies and joint venture must be 
approved by MOFTEC. Its counterparts, State Planning Commission (SPC), and the
18 Tomsett, Eric G., Bater, Paul and Daiber, Claudia (1996) The International Guide to Mergers and 
Acquisitions, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.
19 Whalley，M. and Heymann, T. (1996). International Business Acquisitions Major Legal Issues & 
Due Diligence. Kluwer Law International
20 Capener, Cole R. (1996). A Guidebook to Mergers and Acquisitions in China. Asia Information
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State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) are responsible for the state 
economic plan and evaluating and approving the projects beginning at early stages of 
an acquisition process. China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) in charge 
of public issuance and trading of securities in China plays an crucial role in M&A 
activities involving listed companies. It has the authority to take action against firms 
that make unauthorized M&A deals.
Any M&A transactions involving financial institutions must be approved by People 
Bank of China which has absolute supervisory and regulatory authority over all 
financial institutions in China. In China, Foreign-Invested Enterprise Law, the 
Company Law and Securities law are main regulations related to M&A. The 
Company Law governs the establishments of limited liability companies and the joint 
stock limited companies as well as the issue and transfer of shares in listed or private 
joint stock limited companies. The Securities Law requires that shareholdings of a 
legal person that reaches 5% of the listed company must report and disclose the 
acquisition within three business days. If shareholding reaches 30%, the purchasers 
have to make a general offer to all other shareholders within 45 business days. If 
75%, the trading of shares will be stopped being traded on the stock market. If 






The sample is made use of merger or acquisition announcements rather than lists of 
completed acquisitions to decrease ex post selection and classification bias. 
Information about merger or acquisition announcements over the period from 1 
January 1990 to 31 December 1998 are contained in the Extel Database CD-ROM 
1998 including Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Japan. The 
announcement must be the first notice to the public. If a stock has more than ten 
missing returns in the estimation period, or any missing return in the event period, it is 
eliminated from the sample. The sample is divided into six subsets according to their 
listing location.
Daily stock returns are used over the analysis and estimation periods. The daily prices 
are obtained from the Sequencer Database CD-ROM 1999. Announcements are 
classified by type of acquisition (merger or acquisitions) and form of target firms 
(private or public companies) and mode of payment (cash or share) in the study which 
are stated information of Extel Database CD-ROM 1998.
With cases in Hong Kong, the daily closing rates of return for securities and market 
indices of Hong Kong Stock Exchange are used. Hong Kong Hang Seng Index is 
used as a proxy for the market returns for securities listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong. In China, the daily closing rates of return for securities and market
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indices of the Shanghai Stock Exchange are used. As the sample of target firms and 
bidding firms is listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange only in the sample according to 
the information at Extel Database CD-ROM 1998. The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Index is used as a proxy for the market returns. In Taiwan, the daily closing rates of 
return for securities and market indices of the Taiwan Stock Exchange are used. 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Average Index is used as a proxy for the market 
returns. In Japan, the daily closing rates of return for securities and market indices of 
Japan Stock Exchange are used. The Nikkei Average 500 Index is used as a proxy for 
the market returns. In Singapore, the daily closing rates of return for securities and 
market indices of Singapore Stock Exchange are used. Singapore Stock Exchange All 
Share (SGP) Index is used as a proxy for the market returns. In South Korea, the 
daily closing rates of return for securities and market indices of South Korea Stock 




The market model which is one of the benchmarks in measuring abnormal return with 
daily data is employed. Adjustments of daily closing price are made for stock 
dividends and splits. The daily closing rates of return are calculated by:
R,t = [( Pr P t-i+ D it) / P t.,]X 100%  (1)
where
Rit = the rate of return on security i on day t,
Pit = the closing price on security i on day t,
Pit-i = the closing price on security i on day t - 1 and
Dit = the cash dividend on security i on the ex-dividend day concerned
The daily closing rates of market indices are calculated by:
Rmt = [(Pmt — Pmt-l) Z Pmt-I] X 100% (2)
where
Rmt = the rate of return on the market index on day t,
Pmt = the closing market index on day t and,
Pmt-i = the closing market index on day t-1.
Brown and Warner (1985) concluded that the market model was better than other 
benchmarks such as mean adjusted return model and market adjusted return model in 
measuring abnormal return with daily data. Accordingly, Dodd and Ruback (1977) 
and Dodd (1980) used the market model to measure abnormal returns. Thus, this 
study employed the market model as a benchmark to measure abnormal returns. It 
indicates a linear relationship between security returns and returns on a market 
portfolio given below:
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Rjt = 巧 +爲穴时+m  
where
(3)
R j t = the daily rate of return on security j on day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index on day t.
[ij =  a covariance between RJt and divided by a variance of R mt  ̂ i.e., covariance (Rjt, 
R ml) / Var (Rml)
a f =  expected value of (R r PjRm), and
(ij, = model error term of security j on day t, with expected value equal to zero.
In order to capture those abnormal returns, it is necessary to determine the expected 
normal return in the observation period. A set of observation periods and event 
periods are set to see whether abnormality happens in various observation periods and 
then data from this period are analyzed.
The methodology mirrors the one adopted by Huang and Walkling (1987) that a 
maximum of 351 daily return observations are used for the period around the event 
starting at day t-300 and ending at day t+50. The estimation period is from trading 
day t-300 through trading day t-51, with respect to the initial acquisition 
announcement where t is an initial date of announcement. The following 101 days (- 
50 through +50) is designated as the event period. The pre-announcement period is 
from day -50  to day -2 . The announcement period is from day -1 to day 0. The 
post-announcement period is from day +1 to day +50. The following diagram 
illustrates those periods in detail.
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Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between actual returns and 
estimated expected returns:
A  A
ARp — Rjt - (ocj+PjRmt) (4)
A A
where R“ is the daily rate of return on security j over day t ， a n d a r e  estimates of
model parameters aj a n d  ^  ARJt is the estimated abnormal return for security / over 
day t and t is the tth day of the analysis period, measured in relation to the initial 
acquisition announcement date.
The average abnormal return (AAR) across all securities for any individual time 
period t in the estimation period is obtained by aggregating all abnormal returns of 
firms with return data on day t divided by N (the number of firms with return data on 
day t):
f ，A R J- (5)
M
In order to examine the cumulative effect of events, cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) are produced.
T2
CAAR(ti,t2 )= 工  AARt (6)
t=T\
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where T1 is the first day of an event period in which the AARj are accumulated and T2 
is the last day of an event period in which the A A R t are accumulated.
Student t-statistics are computed for average abnormal returns. Firstly, the standard 
deviation is for abnormal returns of each security in the control or estimation period 
(Brown and Warner 1985):
S E =  - A 4 ^ )  / ( r - 1 ) ] ^
t=T]
(7)
where SE is the standard deviation of average abnormal returns during the estimation 
period, T is the number of periods in the observation period, T1 and T2 are the first 
and last day in the estimation period. A A R t is average abnormal returns across all
securities for any individual time period t in the estimation period. A A R  is average 
abnormal return across all the securities during the estimation period:
7=1
ARjt is the estimated abnormal return for security j  over day t and N is number of 
securities for time period t in the estimation period.




Finally, to test each individual period abnormal return in the event period, the average 
abnormal return is obtained for that period:
where ARj, (abnormal return) is equal to:
A  A
ARji = Rjt — ( 〇? j+  /3jRml)
We divide it by the standard deviation obtained in equation (7)
The test statistic for significant abnormal return for everyday in the event period is:
Hypothesis 1: H〇: AARt = 0 
H !： A A R ,^0
Where A A R t is average abnormal returns across all securities for any individual time 
period t in the event period.
In order to test the presence of significant cumulative average abnormal return over a 
certain period, the Student t-statistics is also used. It is the ratio of CAAR 
(cumulative average abnormal return) to its estimated standard deviation.
Average test statistic for cumulative average abnormal return:
a a r . = y ^ y ， a r .
AAR./SE (8)
Tstat = CAAR/[SE(n)1/2] (9)
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n is the number of trading days from starting to ending over which the average 
abnormal return is calculated. It could be as little as two periods or as large as the 
entire event period.
Hypothesis 2: H〇: CAARyiy2 = 0
H i ； C A A R y l y 2  7^ 0
Where yl is the first day of the pre-announcement period, announcement period or
post-announcement period and y2 is the last day of the pre-announcement period,
announcement period or post-announcement period in which the cumulative average 
abnormal return is calculated.
The following section is devoted to test whether various factors such as types of 
acquisition, types of target firms and modes of payment, affect cumulative abnormal 




Test of hypotheses 3 to 7 is established from coefficients obtained in equations (10) 
and ( 1 1 ), a multiple regression with binary independent variables is modeled:
CARyiy2= (X〇+piDiH-p2D2*^p3D3+p4RMZ+p5M+|j，i (10)
CARyiy2 = oti+入 iD i+A^Di+A^RMZ+A^M+jli* (11)
where:
CARyiy2 = cumulative abnormal return from day yl to day y2 22 
Dj=l if the type is acquisition 
Di= 0  otherwise 
D2=l if target firm is private 
D2=0 otherwise
Di=l if mode of payment is cash 
〇3 = 0  otherwise
RMZ = relative size of the market value of the target to bidder (in 
US$) at announcement date
M = market size of bidding firms (in US$) at announcement date 
(calculated by the product of number of outstanding share and 
closing price at announcement date) 
a 〇 = intercept term of the equation 1 0  
Pi, P2, P3, P4 and (3.s= coefficients of the equation 1 0  
a[ = intercept term of the equation 1 1  
入1，U 4 and 入5= coefficients of the equation 1 1
22 yl is the first day of the pre-announcement period, announcement period or post-announcement 




|ii and |l* = error terms
Eq. (10) models CAR of bidding firms with dummy variables for the type of 
acquisition, type of target firm and mode of payment and variables such as market size 
of bidding firms, and relative size of the market value of the target to bidder play as 
control variables. Eq. (11) models CAR of target firms with dummy variables for 
types of acquisition and modes of payment and other variables such as market size of 
bidding firms and relative size of the market value of the target to bidder act as 
control variables. The only difference between the two equations is that there is a 
dummy variables for types of target firm in Eq. (10) but not in Eq. (11).
Tests of hypotheses are equivalent to test of the following coefficients:
In equation (10) CARyly2 = 〇(〇*+*(3lDi+P2D2+p3D3+P4RMZ +p5M+|U，i
H,： P i =〇 (acquisitions vs. mergers)
h 4： P2 =〇 (public target firms vs. private target firms)
Hs： p3 =〇 (cash offer vs. share offer)
In equation (11) CARyiy2 = 〇i+入iDi+、 D3+?i4RMZ + 入
h 6： X\ =0 (acquisitions vs. mergers)
h 7： 人3 =0 (cash offer vs. share offer)
All coefficients are zero under the null hypotheses whilst the coefficients of alternative 
hypotheses are not equal to zero. The null hypotheses are tested simultaneously.
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Chapter 5: Discussion of Result
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
The number of M&A activities in all subsets are mentioned in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Over half of the events occurred in 1997 and 1998. Table 1 figures the distribution of 
announcements over the entire sample and various classifications. There are 45 
mergers and 513 acquisitions for the overall sample in which 123 public (target) firms 
and 435 private (target) firms are involved. Cash is the major payment method in the 
entire sample as the percentage of mergers and acquisitions involving cash is 
substantially higher: 90 %  of acquisitions are pure cash transactions. Table 1 reveals 
that public firms are the only minority target firms.
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Table 1
The Characteristics for M&A announcements by countries
Distribution of characteristics for acquisition announcements at Extel Database CD- 
ROM 1998 was over the period January 1990 through December 1998. Classifications 
were based on the announcements at Sequencer Database and the accompanying 
articles. There were totally 558 M&A announcements.____________________









Cash Share Private Public
Merger 5 0 4 1
Acquisition 125 12 130 7
Sub-total 142
China Merger 1 3 4 0
Acquisition 8 6 14 0
Sub-total 18
Taiwan Merger 2 0 0 2
Acquisition 75 0 14 61
Sub-total 77
Japan Merger 7 0 4 3
Acquisition 29 0 27 2
Sub-total 36
Singapore Merger 0 1 1 0




Merger 26 0 24 2
Acquisition 126 0 99 27
Sub-total 152
Sub-total 536 22 435 123
Percentage of 
Total




M&A announcements in Sequencer Database in 1990s
Distribution of characteristics for acquisition announcements at Extel Database CD- 
ROM 1998 was over the period January 1990 through December 1998. Classifications 
were based on the year. There were 558 announcements.
Hong
Kong
China Taiwan Singapore Japan South
Korea
Total Percentage of the 
overall sample
1998 12 1 35 46 27 10 131 23.48%
1997 40 6 33 40 9 6 134 24.01%
1996 35 8 2 32 20 13 110 19.71%
1995 18 2 0 22 61 3 106 19.00%
1994 13 1 0 5 14 0 33 5.91%
1993 13 0 0 2 20 0 35 6.27%
1992 4 0 1 0 0 0 5 0.90%
1991 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.54%
1990 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.18%
35
5.2 Abnormal Returns on Bidding Firms and Target Firms
Results of average abnormal return on bidding firms during the announcement period 
are summarized in table 3. There are no significant average abnormal returns of bidding 
firms in each individual country on day -1 and day 0 because t-statistics are insignificant 
at 10% significant level. Table 4 indicates no significant cumulative average abnormal 
return of all bidding firms during the announcement period and pre-announcement 
period, but there is significant cumulative average abnormal return of all bidding firms at 
the post-announcement period. Also, table 4 shows no significant cumulative average 
abnormal return of target firms surrounding the announcement period. The t-statistics 
of cumulative average abnormal returns of target firms are not significant at 10% 
significant level.
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Table 3: Average abnormal return on bidding firms at the announcement period 
Average abnormal return (A A R )  for 558 bidding firms from day -1 to clay 0 at Extel Database 
acquisition-related announcement and the sample period from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1998 
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the
A  A
estimated expected return: ARjt = Rjt - ( 〇：y+ P jR mt) 
where
Rjt= the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rnit = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
The average abnormal return (A A R )  across all securities for any individual time period t in the 
estimation period was obtained by aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on day t 
and dividing by N (the number of firms with return data on day t):
a a r ' " Y n , i A R j>；=i
Location Day Average Abnormal Return 
% (AAR)
T-statistics
Hong Kong -1 -0.26% -0.89
0 -0.13% -0.47
China -1 -1.00% -1.56
0 0.01% 0.01
Taiwan -1 -0.47% -1.42
0 -0.18% -0.55
Singapore -1 0.36% 1.57
0 0.20% 0.89
Japan -1 0.60% 1.40
0 - 0 . 39% -0.92
South Korea -1 -1.41% -1.13
0 0.25% 0.20
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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The cumulative average residual (CAAR) of individual country is reported in Figures 1 
to 6. These results show that the CAAR of bidding firms in most markets such as 
Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore tends to increase before the announcement 
date, possibly resulting from an information leakage to the market. By checking CAAR 
on day 50 after announcement, there are positive cumulative abnormal returns to 
shareholders of bidding firms in all countries except Hong Kong. In other words, 
reactions of shareholders in most countries are positive related to M&A announcements.
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where T1 is day -50 of event pericxi in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was day +50 
of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated. The average abnormal return (AAR) 
across all securities for any individual time period t in the estimation period was obtained by 
aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on day t and dividing by N (the 
number of firms with return data on day t):
A A R - = y N , t A R j,
The abnormal
M
return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the
A
Rjt -  ( a j+ PjRmt )estimated expected return: ARj 
where
Rj, = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index over day t
Figure 1 Hong Kong: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for Bidding Firms
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Day Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for bidding firms in China from day -50 to day 
+50.
T2
C A A R (t i ,t2)= y ,AARt
t=T\
where T1 is day -50 of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was day +50 
of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated. The average abnormal return (AAR) 
across all securities for any individual time period t in the estimation period was obtained by 
aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on day t and dividing by N (the 
number of firms with return data on day t):
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the
A A
estimated expected return: ARjt = Rjt - ( CXj+ PjRmt ) 
where
Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
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Figure 3 Taiwan: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for Bidding Firms





where T1 is day -50 of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was day +50 
of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated.
The average abnormal return (AAR) across all securities for any individual time pericxi t in the 
estimation period was obtained by aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on 
day t and dividing by N (the number of firms with return data on day t):
aar'= /Ni
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return
,  A  A
and the estimated expected return: ARjt = Rjt - ( ^j+  P jRmt) 
where
Rj, = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
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Day [
^ -C u m u la tiv e  Average Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for bidding firms in Japan from day -50 to day 
+50.
T2
CAAR(ti,t2)= ^ A A Rt
t=T\
where T1 is day -50 of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was day +50 
of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated. The average abnormal return (AAR) 
across all securities for any individual time period t in the estimation period was obtained by 
aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on day t and dividing by N (the 
number of firms with return data on day t):
湯 尸 y N , l A R 〗i
M
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the
A A
estimated expected return: ARjt = Rjt - ( ^j+  (ijRm, ) 
where
Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
Figure 4 Japan: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for Bidding Firms
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Figure 5 Singapore: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for Bidding Firms
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Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for bidding firms in Singapore from day -50 to 
day +50.
T2
CAAR(ti,t2)= y ,  AA/?r
t=T\
where T1 is day -50 of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was day +50 
of event period in which the AARt were accumulated. The average abnormal return (AAR) 
across all securities for any individual time period t in the estimation period was obtained by 
aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on day t and dividing by N (the 
number of firms with return data on day t):
^ ^ Y n , t ARJ，
7=1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the
A A
estimated expected return: ARjt = Rj, - ( fijRm, ) 
where
Rjt= the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
Hvvu
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Figure 6 South Korea: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for Bidding Firms
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输
Day Cumulative Average Abnormal Return
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for bidding firms in South Korea from day -50 
to day +50.
T2
CAAR(ti,t2)= ^ ,A A R t
t=T\
where T1 is day -50 of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was day +50 
of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated. The average abnormal return (AAR) 
across all securities for any individual time period t in the estimation period was obtained by 
aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on day t and dividing by N (the 
number of firms with return data on day t):
a a r '= Y n , t A R p
7=1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the
A 八
estimated expected return: ARjt = Rjt - ( CCj+ fijRml), 
where
Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,











The CAAR for all bidding firms at the announcement period is not statistically 
significant. As reported in table 4, only Singaporean bidders’ CAAR is positively 
significant. It reflects that announcement effect to market is not sufficient enough to 
influence stock prices during the announcement period since investors may hold 
differing opinions. Some of them are optimistic, some are pessimistic and some are 
waiting before taking any action. Different responses would cancel each other. In this 
period, Singapore bidders score the highest CAAR of 0.6%, followed by Japanese 
(0.2%), Chinese (-1% ), Hong Kong^ (-0.39% ), Taiwan (-0.65% ) and South Korean 
(-1.16% ), at announcement period. Japan has the most bidding firms (65%) earning 
positive CAAR among six countries.
During the pre-announcement period, over half of those bidders count positive CAAR. 
Japanese bidders score the highest CAAR of 9%, followed by Singaporean (7%), Hong 
Kong^ (5%), Taiwanese (4.6%), Chinese { - A 3 % )  and South Korean 
(-6% ). Results of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan are statistically 
significant. Most bidding firms face positive CAAR because investors overestimate the 
bidders on the future efficiency of the gain from the merger. Hence, they may hold 
more stocks. While more information release in stock markets such as financial 
information of firms involved and terms and conditions of merger proposals, some 
investors change their minds. Japan remains a country with the most bidding firms 
(72%) earning positive CAAR among six countries.
At the post-announcement period, South Korea obtains the highest CAAR of 52.8%. 
The next are Chinese (13%), Singaporean (7%), Taiwanese (5.58%) and Japanese (3%). 
China becomes a country with the most bidding firms earning positive CAAR among six
4 5
countries, due to the fact that most companies face mounting loans and their asset 
values are depreciated subsequent to the Asia Financial Crisis. Therefore, it is favorable 
to bidding firms to acquire them. If M&A activities are successful and bidding firms 
improve the target firms * performance, it is profitable for bidding firms. The result 
reflects that M&A announcements create positive effect to most enterprises in Asia.
As a whole, shareholders of bidding firms could not earn abnormal returns at the 
announcement period. For the two-day announcement period (Day-1 to Day 0), 
bidding-firm shareholders earn an insignificant CAAR of -0.38% , while the CAAR from 
day -50  to day -2 faced by bidding firms amounts to 2.81%. Over half of the bidding 
firms have positive CAAR for this period. The percentage of the bidding firms that have 
positive CAAR for this period increase to 51%. Compared with the pre-announcement 
period and announcement period, the CAAR to bidders is a statistically significant 
11.2% during the post-announcement period (day+1 to day +50).
However, the CAAR to target firm from day -50  to day -2 faced by target firms 
amounts to -2.3% . For the two-day announcement period (Day-1 to Day 0), target- 
firm shareholders earn an insignificant CAAR of -0.24%. Compared with the pre- 
announcement period and the announcement period, the CAAR is -6.8%  during the 
post-announcement period (day+1 to day +50). CAAR drops due to the fact that 
investors and speculators overbuy the target stocks and performance of target firms 
does not match market expectations. Investors sell their stocks, which results in stock 
prices of target firms dropping dramatically. Besides, speculators buy stock of target 
firms because they expect the stock prices to rise due to M&A announcement. 
However, some M&A attempts would fail to complete, so profit-making investors and
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speculators sell their shares of target firms. They think that the share prices would not 
rise any more. The results of individual country are reported in table 5 to table 10.
4 7
Table 4: Summary of CAAR and t-statistics of bidding firms and target firms involved in 
M&A.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from day I to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 
and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -3 0 0  to day -51.
T2
CAAR<ti T2) = 1 . A A R ,
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of the pre-announcement period, announcement period or post-announcement 
period and T2 is the last day of the pre-announcement period, announcement period or post­
announcement period
A A R r = / N l  l A R J.7=1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
AR j, =  Rj, -  ( OCj^ j R m l )
where
Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,



























P a n e l  A :  P r e -a n n o u n c e m e n t  p e r io d
CAAR 
(day-50 to -  
2 )
5% -4.3% 4.6% 1% 9% -6.18% 2.81% -2.3%
T- statistics 2.65*** -0.14 1.98** 4.31*** 3.11*** -0.71 1.67 -0.97






52% 44% 40% 57% 72% 6 6 % 55% N.A.
P a n e l  B :  A n n o u n c e m e n t  p e r io d
CAAR 
(day- 1  toO)
-0.39% - 1% -0.65% 0 .6 % 0 .2 % -1.16% -0.38% -0.24%
T- statistics -1.35 -1.56 -1.69* 2.46*** 0.5 - 1 .2 1 -1.58 -0.84





41% 59% 40% 50% 65% 49% 51% N.A.
P a n e l  C: P o s t-a n n o u n c e m e n t  p e r io d
CAAR 
(day 1 to 50)
-11% 13% 5.58% 7% 3% 52.82% 1 1 .2 % -6 .8 %
T-statistics -2.24*** 0 . 1 2 2 6 . 1 1 *** 2 7 9 *** 7 4 7 *** 4 2 *** -1.60




(day 1 to 50)
30% 11% 42% 53% 44% 40% 48% N.A.
***, and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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N .A . is  for “not a v a ila b le”
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Table 5: Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
142 bidding firms in Hong Kong from 50 days before through 50 days after merger & 
acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from dayl to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 
and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -300  to day -51.
T2
CAAR{Ti>T2)= ^  A A R j
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of event period in which the A A R , were accumulated and T2 was the last day
N
of event period in which the A A R , were accumulated. A A R t = ^  A R Jt
1 >=i
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
AR j, =  Rj, - j +  P j R m t)
where Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
















-50 0.08%0.28 0.08%0.28 1 -0.61% -2.12** 4.35% 2.09**
-49 0.08% 0.27 0.16%0.39 2 0.18% 0.63 4.53% 2.16**
-48 -0.59% -2.05** -0.43% -0.87 3 0.04% 0.14 4.57% 2.16**
-47 -0.45% -1.55 -0.88% -1.53 4 -0.06% -0.21 4.51% 2.11**
-46 -0.42% -1.46 -1.30% -2.02** 5 0.03%0.09 4.54% 2.10**
-45 0.88% 3.04*** -0.43% -0.60 6 -0.27% ■0.95 4.26% 1.96**
-44 0.32% 1.12 -0.10% -0.14 7 -0.11% -0.39 4.15% 1.89*
-43 -0.40% -1.39 -0.50% ■0.62 8 -0.29% -0.99 3.86% 1.75*
-42 -0.05% -0.16 -0.55% -0.64 9 0.04% 0.12 3.90% 1.75*
-41 -0.44% -1.53 -0.99% ■1.09 10 -0.16% -0.55 3.74% 1.66
-40 0.40% 1.40 -0.59% -0.62 11 0.08% 0.27 3.82% 1.68
-39 0.23%0.78 -0.36% -0.36 12 -0.33% -1.15 3.49% 1.52
-38 -0.03% -0.11 -0.40% -0.38 13 0.08%0.29 3.57% 1.55
-37 0.35% 1.23 -0.04% -0.04 14 -0.34% -1.16 3.24% 1.39
-36 0.01% 0.05 -0.03% -0.02 15 0.02% 0.07 3‘26% 1.39
-35 0.01% 0.03 -0.02% -0.02 16 -0.25% -0.SS 3.00% 1.27
-34 -0.08% -0.28 -0.10% -0.08 17 0.50% 1.73 * 3.50% 1.47
-33 0.39% 1.34 0.29% 0.23 IS -0.09% -0.32 3.41% 1.42
- n 0.48% 1.65 0.76%0.61 19 0.51% 1.78 * 3.92% 1.63
-31 -0.17% -0.59 0.59% 0.46 20 -0.16% -0.56 3.76% 1.55
-30 -0.75% -2.62** -0.16% -0.12 21 -0.13% -0.46 3‘63% 1.48
■29 -0.77% -2.68*» -0.93% -0.69 22 -0.13% ■0.46 3.49% 1.42
-28 0.30% 1.05 -0.63% ■0.46 23 -0.57% -1.99** 2.92% 1.18
-27 -0.19% -0.65 -0.82% -0.58 24 -0.60% -2.07** 2.32% 0.93
-26 -0.57% -1.96* -1.38% ■0.96 25 -0.39% -1.34 1.94% 0.77
-25 -0.08% -0.29 -1.47% -1.00 26 0.27% 0.93 2.20% 0.87
-24 0.14% 0.49 -1.33% -0.89 27 -0.24% -0.82 1.97% 0.77
-23 o.on 0.04 -1.31% -0.86 28 -0.30% -1.05 1.67% 0.65
-22 2.00% 6.95 *** 0.69% 0.44 29 -0.28% •0.99 1.38% 0.54
-21 -0.19% -0.66 0.50% 0.32 30 ■0.17% -0.60 1.21% 0.47
-20 -0.12% -0.43 0.37% 0.23 31 -1.27% -4.40*** -0.06% -0.02
-19 0.08%0.28 0.45% 0.28 32 -0.62% -2.15 ** -0.68% •0.26
-18 0.24% 0.84 0.70% 0.42 33 -0.71% -2.45** -1.39% -0.52
-17 0.14% 0,47 0.83% 0.49 34 -0.26% -0.92 -1.65% -0.62
-16 0.34% 1.19 1.18%0.69 35 -0.59% -2.05 ** -2.24% -0.84
-15 0.78% 2 .1 2 * * 1.96% 1.13 36 -0.13% -0.46 -2.37% -0.S8
-14 -0.24% -0.82 1.73%0.98 37 -0.82% -2.84 *** -3.19% -1.18
50
-13 0.02%0.06 1.74%0.98 38 -0.24% -0.82 -3.42% -1.26
■12 -0.22% -0.78 1.52%0.84 39 0.28%0,97 -3.15% -1.15
-11 0.67% 2.34** 2.19% 1.20 40 -0.09% -0.32 -3.24% -1.18
-10 0.51% 1.76* 2.70% 1.46 41 -0.57% -1.99 ** -3.81% -1.38
-9 0.41% 1.44 3.11% 1.67 42 -0.16% -0.54 -3.97% -1.43
-8 0.10%0*33 3.21% 1.70* 43 0.01%0.02 -3.96% -1.42
-7 0.18%0.63 3.39% 1.77* 44 -0.52% -1.80 * -4.48% -1.59
-6 0.71% 2.46** 4.10% 2.12** 45 -0.36% -1.25 -4.84% -1.71 *
-5 0.09% 0.30 4.18% 2.14** 46 -0.51% -1.76* -5.35% -1.88*
-4 -0.13% -0.44 4.06% 2.05** 47 -0.25% -0.88 -5.60% -1.96**
-3 1.30%4‘50 … 5.36% 2.68** 48 0.04% 0.12 -5.56% -1.94*
-2 0.00%0.01 5.35% 2.65** 49 -1.28% -4.44** -6.84% ■2.37**
-1 -0.26% -0*89 5.10% 2.50** 50 0.37% 1.27 -6.48% -2.24**
0 -0.13% -0.47 4.96% 2.41**
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 6: Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
18 bidding firms in C hina from 50 days before through 50 days after merger & 
acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from dayl to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 




where T1 is the first day of event period in which the A A R , were accumulated and T2 was the last day
N
of event period in which the A A R t were accumulated. A A R t ~ ^  AR^
1 7=1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
AR j, =  Rj, -  (CXj+ P j R m t )
where Rj, = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,

















-50 -0.05% -0.08 -0.05% -0.08 1 -0.87% -1.35 -6.14% -0.18
-49 0.78% 1.22 0.73% 0.57 2 0.51% 0.80 -5.62% -0.16
-48 -0.10% -0.16 0.63% 0.33 3 -0.26% -0.40 -5.88% -0.17
-47 0.43% 0.67 1.06% 0.41 4 -0.45% -0.70 -6.33% -0.18
-46 -0.58% -0.91 0.48% 0.15 5 -0.50% -0.77 -6.83% -0.19
-45 0.29% 0.46 0.77% 0.20 6 0.71% 1.11 -6.11% -0.17
-44 0.01% 0.02 0.78% 0.17 1 -1.35% -2.09*** -7.46% -0.20
-43 0.46% 0.71 1.24% 0.24 8 0.79% 1.23 -6.67% -0.18
-42 0.09% 0.13 1.33% 0.23 9 1.31% 2.04*** -5.35% -0.14
-41 0.65% 1.00 1.97% 0.31 10 1.92% 2.99*** -3.43% -0.09
-40 -0.77% -1.20 1.20% 0.17 11 -0.49% -0.75 -3.92% -0.10
-39 -0.03% -0.04 1.17% 0.15 12 0.46% 0.72 -3.45% -0.09
-38 -0.01% -0.01 1.17% 0.14 13 1.02% 1.58 -2.44% -0.06
-37 -0.55% -0.85 0.62% 0.07 14 -0.22% -0.34 -2.66% -0.06
-36 -1.14% -1.77* -0.52% -0.05 15 1.57% 2.44*** -1.0S% -0.03
-35 -0.35% -0.55 -0.87% -0.08 16 -0.40% -0.63 -1.49% -0.03
-34 -0.69% -1.07 -1.56% -0.14 17 -0.47% -0.74 -1.96% -0.04
-33 0.47% 0.73 -1.09% -0.09 18 -0.04% -0.06 -2.00% -0.05
-32 -0.03% -0.05 -1.13% -0.09 19 -1.09% -1.69 -3.09% -0.07
-31 0.53% 0.83 -0.59% -0.05 20 0.54% 0.84 •2.55% -0.06
-30 -0.23% -0.35 -0.82% -0.06 21 1.00% 1.56 -1.54% -0.03
-29 1.33% 2.06 … 0.51% 0.04 22 0.22% 0.34 -1.33^ -0.03
-28 -0.05% -0.08 0.46% 0.03 23 -0.11% -0.17 -1 .43^ -0.03
-27 -1.35% -2.10*** -0.89% -0.06 24 0.88% 1.37 -0.55% -0.01
-26 -0.28% -0.43 -1.17% -0.07 25 -0.03% -0.04 -0.58% -0.01
-25 -0.19% •0.30 -1.36% -0.08 26 0.66% 1.03 0.08% 0.00
-24 1.16% 1.81* •0.19% -0.01 27 -0.48% -0.75 -0.40% -0.01
-23 -0.95% -1.48 -1.14% -0.06 28 -0.47% -0.72 -0.86% -0.02
-22 -0.32% -0.50 -1.46% -0.08 29 1.75% 2.73*** 0.89% 0.02
-21 0.42% 0.65 -1.05% -0.05 30 -0.11% -0.17 0.78% 0.01
-20 -0.38% -0.59 -1.43% -0.07 31 -0.54% -0.S5 0.24% 0.00
-19 -0.07% -0.11 -1.50% -0.07 32 0.62% 0.96 0.85% 0.02
-18 0.05% 0.08 -1.45^ -0.07 33 -0.34% -0.53 0.51% 0.01
-17 -1.25% -1.94** -2.70% -0.12 34 0.96% 1.50 1.4S% 0.03
-16 -0.27% -0.42 -2.97% -0.13 35 1.45% 2.26*** 2.93% 0.05
5 2
-15 -0.70% -1.09 -3.67% -0.16 36 -1.55% -2.41… 1.38% 0.02
-14 -0.53% -0.82 -4.20% -0.18 37 0.59% 0.92 1.97% 0.03
-13 0.13% 0.20 -4.07% -0.17 38 1.79% 2.78*** 3.76% 0.07
-12 0.30% 0,46 -3.78% -0.15 39 0.26% 0.40 4.02% 0.07
-11 0.60% 0.94 -3.17% -0.12 40 0.19% 0.29 4.21% 0.07
-10 0.64% 1.00 -2.53% -0.10 41 -1.43% -2.22*** 2.78% 0.05
-9 0.19% 0.29 -2.34% -0.09 42 1.70% 2.64 … 4.47% 0.07
-8 -0 .25% -0.39 -2.60% -0.09 43 0.69% 1.08 5.16% 0.09
-7 -1.11% -1.72 -3.71% -0.13 44 1.90% 2.95*** 7.06% 0.12
-6 0.18% 0.27 -3.53% -0.12 45 -0.12% -0.19 6.94% 0.11
-5 -0.34% -0.52 -3.87% -0.13 46 0.04% 0.06 6.98% 0.11
-4 -1.03% -1.60 -4.89% -0.16 47 0.64% 0.99 7.61% 0.12
-3 0.17% 0.27 -4.72% -0.15 48 -0.28% •0.44 7.33% 0.12
-2 0.45% 0.70 -4‘27% -0.14 49 0.89% 1.38 8.22% 0,13
-1 -1.00% -1.56 -5.28% -0.16 50 -0.57% -0.89 7.64% 0.12
0 0.01% 0.01 -5.27% -0.16
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 7: Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
77 bidding firms in Taiwan from 50 days before through 50 days after merger & 
acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from dayl to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 
and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -3 0 0  to day -51.
T2
CAAR<Ti T2) = J .A A R ,
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of event period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated and T2 was the last day
N
of event period in which the  A A R t were accumulated. A A R t = ^  A R  ”
1 7=1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
A R jt= R i t - ( a j + P j R m l)
where
Rj, = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,

























-50 -0.29% -0 . 8 6 -0.29% -0 . 8 6 1 0.18% 0.54 4.13% 1.73*
-49 -0 . 1 2 % -0.36 -0.41% -0 . 8 6 2 -0.37% - 1 . 1 0 3.76% 1.56
-48 -0.31% -0.92 -0.71% -1.24 3 -0.56% -1 . 6 8 3.21% 1.32
-47 -0.04% -0 . 1 2 -0.75% -1.13 4 -0 .0 1 % -0 . 0 2 3.20% 1.30
-46 0.31% 0.94 -0.44% -0.59 5 0.38% 1.15 3.58% 1.44
-45 -0.08% -0.23 -0.51% -0.63 6 0 .0 0 % 0 . 0 0 3.58% 1.43
-44 -0.62% -1.87* -1.13% -1.29 7 0.16% 0.49 3.74% 1.48
-43 0 .2 0 % 0.61 -0.93% -0.99 8 0 . 1 1 % 0.32 3.85% 1.51
-42 -0 .0 1 % -0.04 -0.95% -0.95 9 -0.37% - 1 . 1 1 3.48% 1.36
-41 -0 . 1 1 % -0.33 -1.06% -1 . 0 1 1 0 -0.16% -0.49 3.32% 1.28
-40 0.55% 1.67 -0.50% -0.46 1 1 0,34% 1.03 3.66% 1.40
-39 0.35% 1.06 -0.15% -0.13 1 2 -0 . 2 2 % -0.67 3.44% 1.31
-38 0.48% 1.44 0.32% 0.27 13 0 . 1 0 % 0.31 3.54% 1.34
-37 0.06% 0.19 0.39^ 0.31 14 0.57% 1.73* 4.11% 1.54
-36 -0.06% -0.18 0.33% 0.26 15 0.30% 0.90 4.41% 1.64
-35 -0.09% -0.26 0.24% 0.18 16 0 . 1 1 % 0.33 4.52% 1.67
-34 0.23% 0 . 6 8 0.47% 0.34 17 -0.35% -1.06 4.17% 1.53
-33 0.17% 0.51 0.64% 0.45 18 0.47% 1.42 4.64% 1.69*
-32 -0.32% -0.98 0.31% 0 . 2 2 19 0.41% 1.23 5.05% 1.82*
-31 0.26% 0.78 0.57% 0.39 2 0 0 . 1 2 % 0.37 5.17% 1.85*
-30 -0.14% -0.42 0.44% 0.29 2 1 0.03% o.os 5.20% 1.85*
-29 -0.36% - 1 . 1 0 0.07% 0.05 2 2 0.77% 2.34*** 5.97% 2 . 1 1 ***
-28 0.41% 1.24 0.48% 0.30 23 0 . 1 0 % 0.29 6.07% 2.13***
-27 0.27% 0.80 0.75% 0.46 24 -0.17% -0.52 5.90% 2.05 …
-26 0.30% 0.90 1.05% 0.63 25 -0.51% -1.54 5.39% 1 .8 6 *
-25 0,44% 1.33 1.49% 0 . 8 8 26 0.13% 0.38 5.51% 1.89*
-24 0.44% 1.33 1.93% 1 . 1 2 27 0.31% 0.92 5.82% 1.99**
-23 -0.03% -0.08 1.90% 1.08 28 0.44% 1.33 6.26% 2 .1 2 ***
- 2 2 0.13% 0.39 2.03% 1,14 29 0.17% 0.50 6.42% 2.17***
-2 】 -0.60% -1.80* 1.44% 0.79 30 0.30% 0.91 6.73% 2.25***
- 2 0 0.44% 1.32 1.87% 1 . 0 1 31 -0.14% -0.43 6.58% 2.19***
-19 0.82% 2.47*** 2.69% 1.43 32 0.31% 0.94 6.90% 2.28***
-18 0.31% 0.95 3.01% 1.58 33 0.47% 1.41 7.36% 2.42 …
-17 -0.57% -1.72* 2.43% 1.26 34 0.42% 1.26 7.78% 2.55***
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-16 -0.05% -0.14 2.39% 1 . 2 2 35 0.29% 0 . 8 6 8.07% 2 .6 2 * * *
-15 0.17% 0,50 2.55% 1.28 36 0.67% 2 . 0 1  … 8.73% 2.82***
-14 0.23% 0.70 2.78% 1.38 37 0.27% 0.82 9.00% 2.90***
-13 -0.03% -0 . 1 0 2.75% 1.35 38 0 .0 0 % 0 . 0 0 9.00% 2 .8 8 ***
■ 1 2 0 . 1 2 % 0.36 2.87% 1.39 39 0.26% 0.77 9.26% 2.94 …
- 1 1 0.03% 0 . 1 0 2.90% 1.39 40 -0.18% -0.55 9.08% 2 .8 7 * * *
- 1 0 0.45% 1.37 3.36% 1.58 41 0.73% 2.19*** 9.80% 3.08***
-9 0.33% 0.99 3.69% 1.72* 42 -0.35% -1.04 9.46% 2.96 …
- 8 0 .6 8 % 2.06** 4.37% 2 . 0 1  … 43 0.46% 1.39 9.92% 3 .0 9 * * *
-7 0 .1 0 % 0.30 4.47% 2.03*** 44 0 .0 1 % 0.03 9.93% 3 .0 7 * * *
- 6 0.06% 0.18 4.53% 2.04 … 45 -0.35% 小 05 9.58% 2.95***
-5 0.30% 0.90 4.83% 2.15*** 46 -0.28% -0.85 9.30% 2.85 …
-4 -0 .2 1 % -0.63 4.62% 2.03*** 47 0.07% 0 . 2 2 9.37% 2 .8 6 ***
-3 0.32% 0.97 4.94% 2.15*** 48 0.58% 1.76* 9.95% 3 .0 2 * * *
- 2 -0.34% -1.03 4.60% 1.98** 49 0 .0 2 % 0.05 9,97% 3.01 …
- 1 -0.47% -1.42 4.13% 1.76* 50 -0.40% - 1 . 2 2 9.57% 2.S7 …
0 -0.18% -0.55 3.95% 1.67
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 8: Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
133 bidding firms in Singapore from 50 days before through 50 days after merger & 
acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from day 1 to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 
and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -300  to day -51.
T2
CAAR<ti,t2)= ^  A A R j
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of event period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated and T2 was the last day
of event period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated. A A R 产 ^  A R  丨
_/=i
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
A R ^ R ^ - ( O C j + (3jR m t)
where Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,


















-50 0.89% 3.87*** 0.89% 3 ‘87 … 1 0 .0 1 %0.06 7.48% 4.53***
-49 0.50% 2.19** 1.39% 4,29 … 2 0.08% 0.33 7.56%4.54***
-48 -0.09% -0.39 1.30% 3_28 … 3 0.24% 1.06 7. SO%4.64***
-47 -0 .0 2 %-0.09 1.28% 2.79 … 4 0.16% 0.69 7.96%4.69***
-46 0.14% 0.62 1.42% 2.77 *** 5 0.18% 0.81 8.14% 4.76***
-45 -0.09% -0.38 1.33% 2>38 … 6 0.33% 1.44 8.47% 4.90***
-44 0 .0 1 %0.04 1.34% 2 .2 2 * * 7 -0.17% -0.75 8.30% 4.76***
-43 0 .2 0 %0 . 8 6 1.54% 2.38 ** 8 -0.05% -0.24 8.25% 4.69***
-42 0.31% 1.35 1.85% 2.69 ** 9 -0.24% -1.04 8 .0 1 %4.52 …
-41 -0.14% ■0.59 1.71% 2.37 ** 1 0 0 .0 2 %0 . 1 1 8.03% 4.49***
-40 0.43% 1.87 * 2.14% 2.82 … 1 1 0.43% 1 . 8 8  * 8.46% 4.70***
-39 0 .2 0 %0.87 2.34% 2.95 … 1 2 0.13%0.55 8.59% 4.73***
-38 0.26% 1.15 2.60% 3.16 *** 13 0.08% 0.34 8.67% 4.73***
-37 -0.03% -0 . 1 1 2.58% 3.01 *** 14 0 .2 0 %0 .S6 8 .8 6 %4.80***
-36 ■0.03% -0 . 1 2 2.55% 2 . 8 8  *** 15 0.16%0.71 9.03% 4.86***
-35 0 .2 1 %0.92 2.76% 3.02 *** 16 0.27% 1.18 9.30% 4.96***
-34 0.69% 3.01 … 3.45% 3.66 本** 17 0.15% 0.67 9.45% 5.01***
-33 0.63% 2.73 … 4.08% 4.20 *** 18 0.05% 0 . 2 1 9.50% 5.00***
-32 0.38% 1.65 4.45% 4.47 *** 19 0.37% 1.62 9.87% 5‘16 …
-31 0 .0 2 %0.07 4.47% 4.37 … 2 0 -0.15% -0 . 6 6 9.72% 5.04***
-30 -0.17% -0.73 4.30% 4.10 *** 2 1 0.18% 0.79 9.90% 5.10***
-29 -0.04% -0.16 4.27% 3.98 … 2 2 0.37% 1.63 10.27% 5.25***
-28 0 .0 0 %-0 . 0 1 4.27% 3.89 *** 23 0.14% 0.63 10.42% 5.29***
-27 -0.05% -0 . 2 2 4.21% 3.76 … 24 0.37% 1,63 10.79% 5.45***
■26 -0 .0 2 %-0.08 4.20% 3.67 … 25 -0.03% -0.13 10.76% 5.39***
-25 0 .0 1 %0.05 4.21% 3.61 … 26 -0.03% -0,13 10.73% 5.34***
-24 0 . 1 0 %0.46 4.31% 3.63 * 木木 27 0.14% 0.60 10.87% 5.38***
-23 -0.24% -1.06 4.07% 3.36 … 28 0.29% 1.25 11.15% 5.48***
- 2 2 0.31% 1.34 4.38% 3.55 … 29 0.33% 1.44 11.48% 5.61 …
- 2 1 0 .0 2 %0.07 4.39% 3.50 … 30 0.52% 2.27 ** 1 2 .0 0 %5.83***
- 2 0 o .m 0.46 4.50% 3.53 … 31 -0.06% -0.26 11.94% 5.76***
-19 -0.40% -1.75 * 4.10% 3_17 … 32 0.26% 1.15 1 2 .2 1 %5.86***
-18 0.78% 3.41 … 4.88% 3_71 … 33 0.44% 1.90 * 12.64% 6.03***
-17 0.35% 1.52 5.23% 3.92 … 34 -0 . 1 1 %-0.47 12.53% 5.94***
-16 0.31% 1.35 5.53% 4.09 … 35 -0.16% -0.70 12.37% 5.83***
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-15 •0,14% -0.60 5.40% 3.93 *** 36 0.08%0.34 12.45% 5.83***
-14 -0.19% -0.83 5.21% 3 7 4  *** 37 0.44% 1.94 ^ 12.89% 6 .0 1 本 衫
-13 0.29% 1.28 5.50% 3.90 … 38 0.07%0.31 12.96% 6 .0 1 ***
- 1 2 -0.09% •0.38 5.41% 3.79 … 39 0.34% 1.47 13.30% 6.13***
- 1 1 0.15% 0 . 6 6 5.56% 3.85 … 40 0.23% 0.99 13.52% 6 .2 0 ***
- 1 0 -0.06% -0.25 5.51% 3.76 *** 41 0 . 2 2 %0.98 13.75% 6.27***
-9 0.29% 1.28 5.80% 3.91 *** 42 0 .0 2 %0.08 13.77% 6‘24 …
- 8 -0.19% -0.84 5.61% 3.74 *** 43 0 . 2 0 %0.89 13.97% 6.30***
-7 -0.04% -0.19 5.57% 3.67 … 44 0 .0 0 %0 . 0 2 13.97% 6.27***
- 6 0.39% 1.71 * 5.96% 3.88 … 45 -0.37% -1.60 13.61% 6.07***
-5 0.24% 1.03 6.19% 3.99 *** 46 0.05% 0.24 13.66% 6.06***
-4 0 .2 1 %0.92 6.40% 4.08 *** 47 0 . 2 0 %0 . 8 8 13.86% 6 . 1 2 ***
-3 0 .2 0 %0.87 6.60% 4.17 … 48 0 .0 1 %0.04 13.87% 6.09***
- 2 0.30% 1.31 6.90% 4.31 … 49 0 .0 0 %-0 . 0 1 13.87% 6.06***
- 1 0.36% 1.57 7.26% 4.49 *** 50 0.18% 0.79 14.05% 6 . 1 1  …
0 0 .2 0 %0.89 7.47% 4.57 …
***， ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%，5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 9: Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
36 bidding firms in Japan from 50 days before through 50 days after merger & 
acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from dayl to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 
and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -3 0 0  to day -51.
T2
C A A R ^ /n ): ^  A A R ,
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of event period in which the A A R t were accumulated and T2 was the last day
N
of event period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated. A A R t = ^  A /? /r
t 7=1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
A R ^ R , - ( O C j + p j R m l)
where Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t，


























■50 0.78% 1.85* 0.78% 1.85* 1 0.27% 0.65 9.75% 3.IS …
-49 0.18% 0.42 0.96% 1.61 2 0.16% 0.38 9.91% 3.20 …
-48 -0 . 1 0 %-0.23 0.87% 1.18 3 0.05% 0 . 1 2 9.96% 3.19 ***
-47 -0.03% -0.06 0.84% 0.99 4 -0.89% -2 . 1 0  ** 9.07% 2 . 8 8  ***
-46 0 .0 1 %0 . 0 1 0.85% 0.89 5 0.27% 0.64 9.34% 2.94 …
-45 0 . 6 6 %1.56 1.51% 1.45 6 -0.52% -1.23 8.S2% 2.75 …
-44 0.05% 0.13 1.56% 1.39 7 0.13% 0.32 8.95% 2.77 **
-43 -0.44% -1.03 1.13%0.94 8 -0.63% -1.48 8.32% 2.55 **
-42 -0 .8 8 %- 2 .0 1 * * 0.25% 0.19 9 1.75% 4.12** 10.07% 3.06 …
-41 -0.46% -1.09 •0 .2 2 %-0.16 1 0 -0.18% -0.43 9.89% 2,98 ***
-40 0.48% 1.13 0.26% 0.19 1 1 -0.42% -0.98 9.47% 2.83 **
-39 -0.33% -0.78 -0.07% -0.05 1 2 -0.16% -0.39 9.31% 2 .7 6  **
-38 - 1 . 1 1 %-2.61** -1.18% -0.77 13 0.45% 1.07 9.76% 2.87 **
-37 0.61% 1.44 -0.57% ■0.36 14 0.49% 1.14 10.25% 2.99 ***
-36 0.46% 1 .09 -0 . 1 0 %-0.06 15 - 1 .2 0 %-2.83** 9.05% 2.62 **
■35 0.59% 1,38 0.48% 0.28 16 0.49% 1.16 9.54% 2.74 **
-34 -0.19% -0.44 0.30% 0.17 17 0.46% 1,08 1 0 .0 0 % 2.85 **
-33 0.46% 1.08 0.75% 0.42 18 -0.13% -0.30 9.87% 2.80 **
-32 0.79% 1.85 * 1.54%0.83 19 -0.94% -2 .2 1 ** 8.94% 2.51 **
-31 0.61% 1.44 2.15% 1.13 2 0 0.36% 0.84 9.29% 2.59 **
■30 -0.18% -0.42 1.97% 1 . 0 1 2 1 -0.04% -0 . 1 0 9.25% 2.56 **
-29 -0.59% -1.39 1.38% 0.69 2 2 0.08% 0.18 9.32% 2.57 **
-28 0.37%0.87 1.75% 0 . 8 6 23 -0.28% -0.65 9.05% 2.48 **
-27 0.53% 1.25 2.28% 1 . 1 0 24 -0 . 1 1 %-0.25 8.94% 2.43 **
-26 -0.27% -0.62 2 .0 2 %0.95 25 0.07% 0.16 9,01% 2.43 **
-25 -0.63% -1.49 1.39%0.64 26 0 . 1 0 %0.24 9.11% 2.44 **
-24 0 , 1 0 %0 . 2 2 1.48%0.67 27 0.81% 1.91 * 9.92% 2.64 * 本
-23 1.80%4.24 … 3.28% 1.46 28 -0.92% -2.16** 9.01% 2.38 **
- 2 2 -0.46% -1.09 2.82% 1.23 29 ■0 .0 2 %-0.05 8.99% 2.36 **
- 2 1 -0.38% -0.90 2.44% 1.05 30 1.30% 3.07 … 10,29% 2.69 **
- 2 0 0.14%0.32 2.57% 1.09 31 -0.40% -0.94 9.89% 2.57 **
-19 0.09% 0 . 2 1 2 .6 6 %1 . 1 1 32 -0.25% -0.59 9.64% 2,49 **
-18 0.96% 2.27** 3.63% 1.49 33 0.25% 0.5S 9.89% 2.54 **
-17 0 .6 6 %1.56 4.29% 1.73* 34 -0 . 1 1 %■0.25 9.78% 2.50 **
-16 0.26%0.61 4.55% 1.81* 35 0.25% 0.58 10.03% 2.55 **
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-15 0.45% 1.05 5.00% 1.96** 36 0.60% 1.41 10.63% 2.6S * 本
-14 0.18% 0.42 5.17% 2 . 0 0  0 37 0 .0 1 %0.03 10.64% 2.67 **
-13 -0.55% -1.29 4.63% 1.77 * 38 -0.47% - 1 . 1 2 10.17% 2.54 ^
- 1 2 -0.60% -1.42 4.02% 1.52 39 -0.28% -0.65 9.89% 2.45 **
- 1 1 -0 . 1 0 %-0.24 3.92% 1.46 40 0.07%0.17 9.96% 2.46 **
- 1 0 1 . 1 1 %2 .6 2 * * 5.03% 1.85* 41 -0 . 1 2 %-0.28 9.84% 2.41 **
-9 0.60% 1.42 5.64% 2 .0 5 * * 42 1.31% 3.08 … 11.15% 2.72 **
- 8 0.76% 1.78 6.39% 2 .2 9 * * 43 -0.49% -1.15 1 0 .6 6 % 2.5” *
-7 0 .8 8 %2.06** 7.27% 2.58** 44 -0.24% -0.57 10.42% 2.51 ^
- 6 0 . 1 2 %0.29 7.39% 2.59** 45 0.53% 1.25 10.95% 2.63 **
-5 0.89% 2 . 1 0 ** 8.28% 2.87** 46 0.62% 1.46 11.57% 2.76 **
-4 0.36%0.85 8.65% 2 .9 1 * * * 47 -1.06% -2.49 ** 10.51% 2.50 本*
-3 0.56% 1.31 9.20% 3.13*** 48 0.63% 1.49 11.14% 2.64 **
- 2 0.06% 0.15 9.27% 3.12*** 49 0.45% 1.07 11.60% 2.73 **
-1 0.60% 1.40 9.86% 3.28*** 50 0.31% 0.72 11.90% 2.7” *
0 -0.39% -0.92 9.47% 3.12***
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 10: Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
152 bidding firms in South Korea from 50 days before through 50 days after merger & 
acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from day 1 to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 
and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -3 0 0  to day -5  ].
T2
CAAR(T1 .T2)= E 歲 ’
l=Tl
where TI is the first day of event period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated and T2 was the last day
N
of event period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated. A A R t = ^  A R p
r J=\
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
A R ^ R . - i O C j + P j R ^ )
where Rji = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,























-50 -0.56% -0.45 -0.56% -0.45 1 0.1S% 0.15 -7.15% -0.79
-49 -0.05% -0.04 -0.61% -0.35 2 1 .2 2 % 0.98 -5.93% ■0.65
-48 -0.61% -0.49 - 1 .2 2 % -0.57 3 5.59% 4‘47 … -0.34% -0.04
-47 ■0.57% -0.46 -1.80% -0.72 4 -0 .8 8 % -0.70 - 1 .2 1 % -0.13
-46 -0.07% -0.06 -1.87% -0.67 5 -0.51% -0.41 -1.73% -0.18
-45 -0.26% -0 . 2 1 -2.14% -0.70 6 -1.19% -0.95 -2.92% -0.31
-44 -0 .2 0 % -0.16 -2.33% -0.71 7 -0.29% -0.23 -3.21% >0.34
-43 0.14% 0 . 1 1 -2.19% -0.62 8 -0.28% -0.23 -3.49% -0.36
-42 0.04% 0.03 -2.16% -0.57 9 -0 . 1 1 % -0.09 -3.60% -0.37
-41 -0.32% -0.26 -2.48% -0.63 1 0 0.46% 0.37 -3.13% -0.32
-40 -0.03% -0.03 -2.51% -0.61 1 1 ■0.25% -0 . 2 0 -3.39% -0.34
-39 0.05% 0.04 -2.46% -0.57 1 2 0 .0 2 % 0 . 0 1 -3.37% -0.34
-38 0.39% 0.31 -2.07% -0.46 13 -1 .0 0 % -0.80 -4.37% -0.44
-37 -0.37% -0.29 -2.44% -0.52 14 -0.63% -0.50 -5.00% -0.50
-36 -0,62% -0.49 -3.06% -0.63 15 -0.93% -0.75 -5.93% -0.58
-35 -0.70% -0.56 -3.76% -0.75 16 0 .0 1 % 0 . 0 1 -5.92% -0.58
-0.73% -0.59 -4.49% -0.87 17 -0.64% -0.51 -6.57% -0.64
-33 -0,64% -0.51 -5.13% -0.97 18 0 .2 0 % 0.16 -6.37% -0 .6 ]
-32 0.05% 0.04 -5.07% -0.93 19 -0 . 1 2 % -0 . 1 0 -6.49% -0.62
-31 -0.25% -0 . 2 0 -5.32% -0.95 2 0 0.31% 0.25 -6.17% -0.59
-30 0.45% 0.36 -4.87% -0.85 2 1 9.20% 7.36 … 3.03% 0.29
-29 -0.36% -0.29 -5.23% -0.89 2 2 9.11% 7 .2 9 * * * 12.14% 1.14
-2S 0.42% 0.34 -4.81% -0.80 23 0 .0 1 % 0 . 0 1 12.15% 1.13
-27 0.30% 0.24 -4.51% -0.74 24 -0 .6 6 % -0.53 11.49% 1.06
■26 -0.30% -0.24 -4.81% -0.77 25 -1.29% -1.03 1 0 .2 0 % 0.94
-2 5 6 . 1 1 % 4.89 … 1.30% 0 . 2 0 26 5.71% 4.57 … 15.92% 1.45
-24 - 1 .2 2 % -0.98 0.08% 0 . 0 1 27 0.37% 0.30 16.29^ 1.48
-23 0.35% 0.28 0.43% 0.06 28 -0.09% -0.08 16.20% 1.46
- 2 2 -0.67% -0.54 -0.24% -0.04 29 0.13% 0 . 1 1 16.33% 1.46
- 2 1 -0.64% -0.51 -0 .8 8 % -0.13 30 0 . 2 0 % 0.16 16.53% 1.47
- 2 0 -0 . 2 1 % -0.17 -1 . 1 0 % -0.16 31 0.47% 0.3S 17.00% 1.50
-19 -0.06% -0.05 -1.16% -0.16 32 -1.18% -0.95 15.81% 1.39
-18 -1.28% ■1 . 0 2 -2.43% -0.34 33 0.06% 0.04 15.87% 1.39
-17 -0 .6 8 % -0.55 -3.12% -0.43 34 -1.08% -0 . 8 6 14.79% 1.28
-16 -0 . 6 6 % -0.53 -3.78% -0.51 35 1 . 1 0 % 0 .S8 15.90% 1.37
6 0
-15 -0.18% -0.15 -3.96% -0.53 36 0.52% 0.42 16.42% 1.41
-14 0 .2 0 % 0.16 -3.77% -0.50 37 0.59% 0.47 17.01% 1.45
-13 0 .1 1 % 0.09 -3.66% -0.47 38 0.62% 0.49 17.63% 1.50
- 1 2 0 .8 8 % 0.70 -2.78% -0.36 39 -0.47% -0.38 17.16% 1.45
- 1 1 -0 .2 0 % -0.16 -2.98% -0.38 40 6 .0 1 % 4.81本** 23.17% 1.94 *
- 1 0 -0.65% -0.52 -3.63% -0.45 41 -1.06% -0.85 2 2 .m 1.84 *
-9 -0.69% -0.56 -4.32% -0.53 42 0.40% 0.32 22.51% 1.87 *
- 8 0.13% 0 . 1 0 -4.20% -0.51 43 0.28% 0.23 22.79% 1 . 8 8  *
-7 -0.83% -0 . 6 6 -5.02% -0.61 44 0.28% 0.23 23.08% 1.89 *
- 6 0.15% 0 . 1 2 -4.87% -0.58 45 0.24% 0,19 23.31% 1.90 *
-5 0.44% 0.35 -4.43% -0.52 46 5.87% 4.69*** 29.18% 2.37 **
-4 -0.40% -0.32 -4.83% -0.56 47 8.32% 6.65 … 37.50% 3.03 ***
-3 -0.83% -0.67 -5.67% -0.65 48 7.56% 6.05*** 45.06% 3.62 …
- 2 -0.51% -0.41 -6.18% -0.71 49 0.28% 0 . 2 2 45.34% 3.63 …
- 1 -1.41% -1.13 -7.59% -0 . 8 6 50 0.16% 0.13 45.50% 3.62 …
0 0.25% 0 . 2 0 -7.33% -0.82
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively.
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5.3 Summary of AAR and CAAR of Bidding Firms and Target Firms
All samples were put together for analysis of performance of AAR and CAAR of 
bidding firms. Results of CAAR from -50 to +50 days are summarized and shown in 
Table 11. CAAR is significantly positive at the post-announcement period, especially 
from day 22 to day 50. In the short term, evidence on significantly positive changes 
after the announcement may suggest that the managers act to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth. Bidding firms are able to implement an operating strategy which maximizes the 
wealth of their shareholders. The market reaction to M&A announcements is generally 
positive. With significantly positive average residuals after the announcement date, it is 
inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis because the initial reaction could not 
reflect the information on shares values. As the period of study is short, the merger 
effect on the bidding firms is not apparent.
During the announcement period and pre-announcement period, the results show that 
there is no significant AAR or CAAR for bidding firms. It is unable to reject the 
hypothesis that abnormal return on the bidding firms at the announcement day is equal 
to zero. Result of abnormal return and t-statistics for bidding firms are summarized in 
table 4.
For target firms, there is no individual analysis of each location due to the sample of 
each location (number of listed target firms) is small. As such, they are put together to 
be analyzed. The summary of results with significant t-value of average abnormal return 
and cumulative average abnormal return at 1%, 5% or 10% from -50 to +50 days is 
shown in Table 12. The target firms have insignificant CAAR of -2.3%  during the pre­
6 2
announcement period, -0.24% during the announcement and -6.8% during the post­
announcement period. The results indicate that abnormal returns on target firms around 
the announcement period is equal to zero.
Figure 7 shows the average residuals from pre- to post-announcement period decrease. 
Investors of target firms face loss when facing M&A attempt indicating that for some 
acquisitions, information concerning a forthcoming corporate takeover is not considered 
’good' news for target firms’ shareholders. This decrease in share prices prior to the 
announcement could similarly be owing to the information leakage to the market. The 
information that is unfavorable for target firms might include poor M&A terms or 
extremely low acquiring prices. A result of poor performance of target firms that makes 
investors sell the stocks provides another possible explanation. It causes prices of the 
stocks to drop and induce takeover.
With insignificant average residuals reported on the day after the announcement date, 
the market adjusts immediately to the acquisition announcement. Subsequently, on the 
second day after the announcement date, it begins to decline gradually, and, in fact, 
most of the remaining average residuals are not statistically significant. This also 
suggests that no new information is released, and the market reaction to this new public 
information is complete on the second day after the announcement.
In addition, the downward movement of cumulative average residuals after 
announcement day shows that there are no net gains from altering the operations of the 
targets. On the other hand, analyzing Table 12 in detail, the negative average residuals 
after the announcement date are greater than those prior to the announcement date.
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There is a drastic negative drift from +2 to 50 days. Thus, it may predict that the terms 
and conditions of the merger proposals released are unable to induce interest from 
shareholders of target firms to hold the stock again. They simply do not think that the 
target's management is improved by the management of bidding firms. Thus, market 
reaction to the target firms engaged in M&A is negative.
Figure 7 shows that the cumulative average residual decreases continuously. 
Additionally, table 12 outlines that the negative CAAR from day -50  to day +50 is 
about 10%. That said, there are negative changes in average residuals after 
announcement.
However, there are several drawbacks, for instance, the study period is short and 
containing unsuccessful events, the merger effect on the target firms is not apparent yet 
and there is no merger effect due to unsuccessful M&A. Besides, the results are biased 
by the bid-ask errors in transaction prices rather than market overreaction due to 
measurement problems with the daily returns computed, based on the 'closing price'. 
Whether the existence of a bid-ask effect, a more detailed investigation is necessary to 
test the validity of this conjecture.
Comparisons of CAAR and AAR of bidding firms and target firms are reported in 
figures 7 and 8 respectively. Figure 7 shows that there is a divergence of CAAR 
(especially at the post-announcement period) between bidding firms and target firms. It 
is worth investigating. Type of acquisition, mode of payment and form of target firms 
are chosen as factors to be tested in the study because most of studies (see Literature
6 4
review) find that these are crucial to affect the abnormal return to investor as a result of
M&A announcement.
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Table 11; Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for 
558 bidding firms in overall samples from 50 days before through 50 days after 
Sequencer merger & acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from day! to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1  to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 





where TI is the first day of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was the last day
of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated. A A R t = ^  A R ) t
/=i
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
ARj, = Rj, ~ ( C C j +  p  j R mt)
where Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,























-50 -0 .0 2 % -0.08 -0 .0 2 % -0.08 1 -0.43% -1.80* 2 .0 0 % 1.15
-49 0.51% 2 . 1 2 *** 0.49% 1.44 2 0.04% 0.17 2.04% 1.16
-48 -0 . 2 2 爷 -0.93 0.27% 0.64 3 0.00% 0 . 0 2 2.04% 1.16
-47 -0.03% -0.13 0.24% 0.49 4 0.16% 0.65 2 . 2 0 % 1.23
-46 -0 .2 0 % -0.83 0.04% 0.07 5 0.81% 3,35*** 3.01% 1.67
-45 0.05% 0 . 2 1 0.09% 0.15 6 0.06% 0.25 3.07% 1.69 *
-44 0.06% 0.26 0.15% 0.24 7 -0.43% -1.77* 2.64% 1.44
-43 0.03% 0.13 0.18% 0.27 8 -0.03% -0.15 2.61% 1.41
-42 -0.07% -0.28 0 . 1 2 % 0.16 9 -0.08% -0.35 2.52% 1.35
-41 -0 . 1 2 % -0.49 0.00% 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.56% 2.32 … 3.08% 1.64
-40 0.03% 0.14 0.03% 0.04 1 1 -0 .0 1 % -0.03 3.07% 1.62
-39 0.15% 0.64 0.19% 0 . 2 2 1 2 0.06% 0.23 3.13% 1.64
-38 0.05% 0 . 2 1 0.24% 0.27 13 0.09% 0.39 3.22% 1.67
-37 -0 .2 1 % -0 . 8 6 0.03% 0.03 14 0.19% 0.78 3.41% 1.76 *
-36 -0.04% -0.17 -0 .0 1 % -0 . 0 1 15 0.18% 0.76 3.59% 1.84 *
■35 0 .0 1 % 0.03 0 .0 0 % 0 . 0 0 16 -0.29% - 1 . 2 1 3.30% 1 . 6 8
-34 0.00% 0 . 0 2 0.00% 0 . 0 0 17 -0.18% -0.76 3.12% 1.57
-33 0.13% 0.54 0.13% 0.13 IS 0.23% 0.95 3.35% 1 . 6 8
-32 0.03% 0.14 0.16% 0.15 19 -0.18% -0.75 3.17% 1.57
-31 0.13% 0.53 0.29% 0.27 2 0 0.04% (US 3.21% 1.58
-30 -0 . 1 0 % -0.40 0.19% 0.17 2 1 0 .2 1 % 0 . 8 8 3.43% 1 . 6 8
-29 -0 .0 2 % -0 . 1 0 0.17% 0.15 2 2 0.24% 1 . 0 1 3.67% 1.78 *
-28 0.08% 0.32 0.25% 0 . 2 1 23 1.54% 6.41 … 5.21% 2.52 …
-27 -0 .2 1 % -0.89 0.03% 0.03 24 卜  1.55% 6.44*** 6.77% 3.24 …
-26 0.03% 0.14 0.07% 0.06 25 -0 .2 0 % -0.84 6.56% 3.13 …
-25 0.03% 0 . 1 2 0.09% 0.08 26 -0.03% -0 . 1 2 6.53% 3.09 ***
-24 0.18% 0.74 0.27% 0 . 2 2 27 -0.17% -0.70 6.36% 2.99 * * 木
-23 0.83% 3.43*** 1 . 1 0 % 0 . 8 6 28 1 . 1 0 % 4.56*** 7.46% 3.49 ***
-2 2 0.42% 1.76* 1.52% 1.17 29 0.24% 1 . 0 0 7.70% 3.58 …
- 2 1 -0.08% -0.34 1.44% 1.09 30 0.04% 0.16 7.74% 3_57 …
- 2 0 -0.17% -0.69 1.27% 0.95 31 0.08% 0.34 7.82% 3.59 ***
-19 -0.03% -0.13 1.24% 0.91 32 -0 .0 1 % -0.03 7.82% 3.56 …
-18 0 . 2 1 % 0.89 1.46% 1.05 33 -0 .0 2 % -0.08 7.80% 3.53 ***
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-17 -0.08% -0.34 1.38% 0.98 34 -0.04% -0.17 7.75% 3.49 …
-16 -0.06% -0.24 1.32% 0.92 35 0 .2 1 % 0,87 7.96% 3.57 …
■15 -0.06% -0.24 1.26% 0.87 36 -0.35% -1.44 7.62% 3‘39 * * 木
■14 -0.17% -0.70 1.09% 0.74 37 0.48% 1.97** 8.09% 3.58 …
-13 0.08% 0.33 1.17% 0.79 38 0.29% 1.19 8.38% 3.69 ***
- 1 2 -0 .0 2 % -0 . 1 0 1.14% 0.76 39 0 . 1 2 % 0.52 8.50% 3 72 ***
- 1 1 0.17% 0.72 1.32% 0.87 40 0 . 1 1 % 0.46 8.61% 3.75 …
■ 1 0 0.40% 1,64 1.71% 1 . 1 1 41 -0.13% -0.53 8.49% 3.67 ***
-9 0.34% 1.42 2.06% 1.32 42 1 . 1 2 % 4.65*** 9.61% 4.14 …
-S 0.04% 0.18 2 . 1 0 % 1.33 43 0 .2 2 % 0.92 9.83% 4.21 …
-7 -0.16% -0 . 6 8 1.94% 1 . 2 1 44 0.31% 1.29 10.14% 4.32 ***
- 6 0.38% 1.57 2.31% 1.43 45 -0 .2 1 % -0.89 9.92% 4  ‘2 〇 …
-5 -0.08% -0.32 2.24% 1.37 46 0.03% 0.14 9.96% 4.20 ***
-4 -0 .0 2 % -0 . 1 0 2 .2 1 % 1.34 47 0 .2 1 % 0 . 8 6 10.16% 4.26 …
-3 0.47% 1.94* 2 .6 8 % 1.61 48 0.80% 3.33 … 10.97% 4.58 …
- 2 0.13% 0.53 2.81% 1.67 49 1 .6 6 % 6 .8 8 *** 12.62% 5.24 …
-I -0.34% -1.40 .2.47% 1.45 50 1 .0 1 % 4.18*** 13.63% 5.63 …
0 -0.04% -0.17 2.43% 1.41
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Figure 7: Comparsion of Cumulative Average Abnormal Return between Bidding Firms and
Target Firms for the Event Period
-^ ir -
Day - Target Firms Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
• Bidding Firms Cumulative Average Abnormal Return
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for all bidding firms and target firms from 
day -50 to day +50.
T2
CAAR(ti,t2)= ^ A A R t
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was the
N,
last day of event period in which the AAR, were accumulated. A A R t = ^
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the 
estimated expected return:
A
ARjt = Rjt - ( /3 jRmt )
where
Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,





Table 12: Average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for 123 
target public firms in overall sample from 50 days before through 50 days after merger 
& acquisition announcement.
The sample period is from January 1990 through September 1998.
The period from day-50 to day-2 is a pre-announcement period. The period from dayl to day 50 is a 
post-announcement period. The period from day-1 to day-0 is an announcement period. Cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) are estimated using the standard market model method as in Brown 
and Warner (1985). Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -3 0 0  to day - 5 1.
T2
CAAR(Xi>T2)= ^  AA Rt
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of event period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated and T2 was the last day
N
of event period in which the A A R t were accumulated. A A R t = ^  A R j t
f 7-1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
ARj, = Rj, - ( f i  jR mt) 
where
Rj, = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,























■50 0 % 0.75 0 % 0.75 1 -1 % ■2.06** -3% -1.35
-49 0% -0.38 0 % 0.26 2 -1% -2.70 … -4% -1.71 *
-48 0 % -0.77 0 % 0.23 3 0% -0 . 8 6 -5% -1.81 *
-47 0 % -0.50 0 % 0.45 4 0% -1.47 -5% -1.99 **
-46 0 % -0.03 0 % 0.41 5 -1% -2.40本* -6 % -2.29 **
-45 0 % 0.75 0 % 0.07 6 -1% -1.85 * -6 % ■2.52 ”
-44 0 % ■0.51 0 % 0.26 7 0% -1.33 -7% -2.67 **
-43 0 % 0.93 0 % 0.08 8 0% -0.24 -7% -2 . 6 8  **
-42 - n -1.57 0 % 0.44 9 0% 0.42 -7% -2.60 **
-41 0% 1.47 - 1 % -0 . 8 8 1 0 0% 1.28 -6% -2.42 **
-40 0 % 0.38 - 1 % -0.73 1 1 1% 1.74 * -6% •2.18 **
■39 - 1 % -1 . 6 8 - 1 % -1.18 1 2 0% -0.67 -6% -2.24 **
-38 1 % 1.48 - 1 % -0.73 13 0% 0.34 -6% -2.18 **
-37 0 % 0.78 - 1 % -0.91 14 - 1 % -1.73* -7% -2.38 **
-36 0 % 0.28 -1 % -0.95 15 0 % 1.3】 -7% -2.52 **
-35 0 % 0.04 - 1 % *0.93 16 - 1 % -2.96… -8% ■2.87 料
-34 0 % 1.30 -2% -1 . 2 2 17 0 % 0.56 -8% -2.78 **
-33 0 % 0.59 -2% -1.04 18 -1 % -1.87* -8 % -2.98 **
-32 0% 0 . 2 2 -1 % -0.97 19 1 % 1 .8 8 * -8 % -2.74 **
-31 0 % 1.44 -2 % -1.26 2 0 0 % 0.56 -8 % -2.65 **
-30 0 % 0.59 -2 % -1 . 1 0 2 1 0 % 1 . 1 1 -7% -2.50 **
-29 0 % 0.17 -2% -1.04 2 2 0 % 0.65 -7% -2.56 **
-28 0 % 1.34 - 1 % -0.74 23 0% 0.17 -7% -2.52 **
-27 1 % 1.67 -1 % -0.38 24 0% 0.13 -7% -2.49 **
•26 0 % 0.82 0 % 0 . 2 1 25 0% -0.44 -7% -2.53 ^
-25 0% 0.14 0 % 0.23 26 0% -0.40 -8% -2.55 **
-24 0 % 0.31 0 % 0.17 27 0% -0.38 -8% -2.58 **
-23 0 % 0.76 0 % 0 . 0 2 28 0% -0.05 -8 % -2.57 **
- 2 2 0 % 1 . 0 0 0 % 0.16 29 0% -0.05 -8 % -2.56 **
• 2 1 0 % 0.49 0 % 0.25 30 0% 0 . 0 1 -8 % -2.54 **
- 2 0 0% 0.06 0 % 0.25 31 1% 2 . 1 0 ** -7% -2.30 **
-19 m 0.06 1 % 0.26 32 0% 0.53 -7% -2 . 2 2  **
-18 0 % 1.30 0 % 0.03 33 -1% -1.58 -7% -2.38 **
-17 0 % 0.15 0 % 0.06 34 0% 0.95 -8 % ■2.47 **
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-16 0 % 0.53 0% -0.03 35 0 % 0.07 -8 % -2.47 **
-15 -1 % -1.60 - 1 % -0.30 36 0 % 1.32 -8 % -2.59 **
-14 -1 % -2 .0 2 ** -1 % -0.63 37 n 1.64 -8 % -2.40 **
-13 0 % 0.85 -2 % -0.76 38 - 1 % -2.62** -9% ■2.67 **
- 1 2 - 1 % -1.61 -2 % - 1 . 0 1 39 0 % 0.40 -8 % -2.61 **
-U 0 % 0.05 -2 % -0.99 40 0 % 0.46 -9% -2.64 **
- 1 0 0 % 0.44 -2 % -1.04 41 0 % 0.96 -8 % -2.53 **
-9 1 % 2.04 ** -2 % -0.72 42 0 % 0.26 -8 % -2.49 **
- 8 0 % 0.15 -2% -0 . 6 8 43 0 % 0.96 -8 % -2.57 **
-7 - 1 % -1.69 * -2% -0.93 44 0% 0.50 -8 % -2.51 **
- 6 0 % -0.17 -2% -0.95 45 0% 0.29 -8 % -2.53 **
-5 0% 0.30 -2% -0.89 46 0% 1 . 2 1 -9% -2.64 **
-4 - 1 % -1,67 -3% -1.13 47 0% 0.93 -9% -2.72 **
• 3 0 % 1.15 -2 % -0.95 48 0 % 0.48 -9% -2.75 **
- 2 0 % 0.25 -2 % -0.97 49 0 % 1.24 -1 0 % -2 . 8 6  **
- 1 0 % 0.49 -2 % -0.90 50 0 % 0.65 - 1 0 % -2.91 …
0 0 % 1.33 -3% -1.07
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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The average abnormal return (AAR) across all securities for any individual time period t in the 
estimation period was obtained by aggregating all abnormal returns of firms with return data on day t 
and dividing by N (the number of firms with return data on day t):
^ ^ Y n , t ARj.
M
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the 
estimated expected return:
A
ARj,= Rj, - ( a >+)8；/?m,) 
where
Rj, = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rml = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
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5.4 Test Factors Affecting Abnormal Return
Before presenting the results regarding how factors affect abnormal returns, a brief 
description is offered about announcement-period abnormal returns for specific 
classification of bidding and target firms to give an insight to the distribution of 
abnormal returns in types of acquisition, modes of payment and types of target firm. 
Cumulative average abnormal return during the announcement period for 
sub-samples of acquisitions and mergers is displayed in Table 13. In Hong Kong, the 
cumulative average abnormal return for acquisition is -0.38% . The corresponding value 
for mergers is -0.01% . Residual for cash offers on average is -0.37%  and those for 
stock offers are -0.02% . Offers involved in public firms have abnormal return 
averaging -0.01%  but the corresponding figure for offers involved in private firms is -  
0.38%.
Taiwanese bidding firms enjoy a -0.63%  of cumulative average abnormal return for 
acquisition. The corresponding value for mergers is -0.02% , for cash offers on average 
is -0.65%  and those for stock offers are 0%. Offers involved in public firms have 
abnormal return averaging -0.53%  but the corresponding figure for offers involved in 
private firms is -0.12%.
In China, the cumulative average abnormal return for acquisition is -0.78% . The 
corresponding value for mergers is -0.22%. Residuals for cash offers on average is - 
0.5% and those for stock offers are averaging -0.5%. Offers involved in public firms 
have abnormal return averaging 0% but the corresponding figure for offers involved in 
private firms is -1 %.
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In Singapore, the cumulative average abnormal return for acquisition is 0.59% . The
corresponding value for mergers is 0.01%. Residual for cash offers on average is 0.59% 
and those for stock offers are 0.01%. Offers involved in public firms have abnormal 
return averaging 0.08% but the corresponding figure for offers involved in private firms 
is 0.52%.
In Japan, the cumulative average abnormal return for acquisition is 0.16%. The 
corresponding value for mergers is -0.04%. Residual for cash offers on average is 
0.02%  and those for stock offers average are 0%. Offers involved in public firms have 
abnormal return averaging 0.03% but the corresponding figure for offers involved in 
private firms is 0.17%.
In South Korea, the cumulative average abnormal return for acquisition is -0.96% . The 
corresponding value for mergers is -0.2%. Residuals for cash offers on average is -  
1.16% and those for stock offers are 0%. Offers involved in public firms have abnormal 
return averaging -0.22%  but the corresponding figure for offers involved in private 
firms is -0.94%.
To sum up, these results show that different types of acquisitions, modes of payment 




Distribution of CAAR of bidding firms by type of acquisition, mode of payment and 
type of target firm.
Announcement-period abnormal return for specific classification of bidding firms in the period January 
1990 through December 1998 were cumulated over the announcement period (i.e., t=-l + t=0).
T2
C AAR <t i .t2)=  A A R ,
t=T\
where T1 is the first day of announcement period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated and T2 was the 
last day of announcement period in which the A A R ,  were accumulated.
a a r > = / N i 1 a r p
7=1
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A  A
A R ]t= R i t - ( a j + p jR m l)
where
Rj, = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
Country T ype o f  acquisitions N u m b e r  o f  f ir m s C u m u la t iv e  a v e r a g e  
a b n o r m a l retu rn
H o n g  K o n g
T ype o f  acqu isition A cquisition 137 -0 .38%
M erger 5 -0 .01%
M ode o f  paym ent m ethod Cash 130 -0 .37%
Slock 12 -0 .02%
T ype o f  target firm P ublic  target firm 8 -0.01%
Private target firm 134 -0 .38%
T a iw a n
T ype o f  acq u isition A cqu isition 75 -0 .63%
M erger 2 -0.02%
M ode o f  paym ent m ethod Cash 77 -0 .65%
Stock 0 0%
T ype o f  target firm P ublic  target firm 63 -0.53%
Private target firm 14 -0.12%
C h in a
T ype o f  acqu isition A cquisition 14 -0 .78%
M erger 4 -0 .22%
M ode o f  paym ent m ethod Cash 9 -0 .50%
Stock 9 -0 .50%
T ype o f  target firm P ublic  target firm 0 0%
Private target firm 18 -1%
S in g a p o r e
T ype o f  acq u isition A cquisition 132 0.59%
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M erger 1 0.01%
M ode o f  paym ent m ethod Cash 132 0.59%
Stock 1 0 .01%
T ype o f  target firm P ublic  target firm 18 0.08%
Private target firm 115 0.52%
Japan
T ype o f  acqu isition A cquisition 28 0.16%
M erger 8 0 .04%
M ode o f  paym ent m ethod Cash 36 0.20%
Stock 0 0%
T yp e o f  target firm P ublic  target firm 5 0.03%
Private target firm 31 0.17%
South Korea
T ype o f  acq u isition A cquisition 126 -0 .96%
M erger 26 -0.2%
M ode o f  paym ent m ethod Cash 152 -L 16%
Stock 0 0%
T ype o f  target firm Public  target firm 29 -0.22%
Private target firm 123 -0 .94%
75
For target firms, various cumulative average abnormal return of acquisitions and
mergers are displayed in Table 14. The cumulative average abnormal return of target 
firms for acquisition is -0.23%. The corresponding value for mergers is -0.01% . 
Residual for cash offers on average is -0.24%  and that for stock offers is unknown 
because all deals are in form of cash payment.
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Table 14
Distribution of CAAR of target firms by type of acquisition and mode of payment
Announcement-period abnormal return for specific classification of target firms in the period January 
1990 through December 1998 were cumulated over the announcement period (i.e., t=-l + t=0).
T2
CAAI^xi X2)= A A R ,
t=Tl
where TI is the first day of announcement period in which the AAR, were accumulated and T2 was the
N
last day of announcement period in which the AARt were accumulated. A A R t = ^  A R
The abnormal return was computed as the difference between the actual return and the estimated 
expected return:
A
ARjt = Rjl- ( a y+ ^ 7 ? m() 
where
Rjt = the daily rate of return on security j over day t,
Rmt = the daily rate of return on market index over day t.
Type of 
acquisition








This part investigates how types of acquisitions, types of target firms and modes of 
payment affect the cumulative abnormal return of bidding firms. It also checks whether 
the cumulative abnormal return of target firms is a function of types of acquisition and 
forms of payment.
The variable of relative size of the market value of the target to bidder (RMZ) is 
dropped in regressions because of the following reasons:
1. The number of observations decreases considerably to 76 because not all 
observations have information about relative size of the market value of targets to 
bidder at announcement day
2. In our sample, it happens that we could only find RMZ data for the observations 
that are cash offers and related to public targets. Therefore, without dropping the RMZ, 
hypotheses 4, 5 and 7 cannot be tested
3. The variable of relative size of the market value of the target to bidder (RMZ) is 
not statistically significant at 5% level in the regressions (the results are shown at 
Appendix 1)
Table 15 reports five regression results at different periods of time for equation (10) to 
test whether the cumulative abnormal return of bidding firms is a function of types of 
acquisition, types of target firms and forms of payment. Test of the hypotheses is 
equivalent to significance tests on coefficient of dummy variables for types of 
acquisition, types of target firms and modes of payment. Regressions A, B and D
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reveal that no dummy variables are significantly affecting cumulative abnormal return 
during pre-announcement and announcement periods. In other words, it means that 
types of acquisitions, types of target firms and modes of payment do not affect the 
cumulative abnormal return of bidding firms during pre-announcement period and 
announcement period.
Regression C indicates the dummy variable of types of acquisition is significantly 
affecting the result of cumulative abnormal return at post-announcement period. 
Similarly, regression E shows that the dummy variable of types of acquisitions is 
significantly affecting abnormal return during post-announcement and announcement 
period. Thus, results assert that only types of acquisition would affect the 
consequence of cumulative abnormal return at the post-announcement period.
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Table 15: Results of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns of bidding firms surrounding mergers and acquisition announcements 
made between January 1990 and December 1998.
Regression A used cumulative abnormal returns during pre-announcement period as the dependent variable. Regression B used announcement-period cumulative 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression C used cumulative abnormal returns during post-announcement-period as the dependent variable. 
Regression D used pre-announcement plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression E used post-announcement 
plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable.
t-statistics were shown in parentheses. The number of observations was 558 for all regressions. Market size of bidding firms at announcement date was 
calculated by the product of number of outstanding share and closing price at announcement date________________________________________________















A (during pre-announcement period) -0.074232 -0.095315 0.039014 -0.004221 0.0002354 -0.00219 0.069369
(-1.394) (-0.720) (0.038) (-0.313) (0.667)
B(during announcement period) -0.003642 0.013187 -0.010819 -0.003609 0.35227 -0.00106 0.87608
(-0.172) ( 1 .0 2 0 ) (-1.327) (-0.219) (0.560)
C (during post-announcement period) 0.599194 -0.759481 0.091138 0.165590 -0.1765 0.01411 3.00693
0 .475) (-3.316)*** (0.623) (0.499) (-0.132)
D(during pre-announcement plus .076505 -0.091533 0.030315 -0.005859 0.12456 0.00301 0.57940
announcement period)
(0.591) (-1.255) (0.650) (-0.055) (0.387)
E (during post-announcement plus -2.238246 2.749636 -0.038120 -0.427348 -0.000253 0.00707 1.99828
announcement period)
(-1.286) (2.803)*** (-0.061) (-0.301) (-0.009)
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 16 reports five regression results regarding equation (11) in different periods of 
time. Results would show whether cumulative abnormal returns of target firms are 
function of types of acquisition and form of payment. Tests of the hypotheses are 
equivalent to significance tests on coefficient of a dummy variable (types of 
acquisition). The results of regressions A, B, C, D and E reveal that the dummy 
variable is insignificantly affecting cumulative abnormal return.
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Table 16: Results of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns of target firms’ shareholders surrounding mergers and acquisition 
announcements made between January 1990 and December 1998.
Regression A used cumulative abnormal returns during pre-announcement period as the dependent variable. Regression B used announcement-period cumulative 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression C used cumulative abnormal returns during post-announcement-period as the dependent variable. 
Regression D used pre-announcement plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression E used post-announcement 
plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable.
t-statistics were shown in parentheses. The number of observations was 123 for all regressions. Market size of bidding firm at announcement date was calculated 
by the product of number of outstanding share and closing price at announcement date
Regression Intercept Coefficient of Type of 
Acquisition (入 !）





A (during pre-announcement -0.008152 -0.007622 -0.00013 0.02315 0.05301
period)
(-1 . 1 0 2 ) (-0.312) (-0.35)
B(during announcement -0.012546 0.009404 -0.00025 -0.02324 0.11424
period)
(-.646) (0.475) (-0.025)





-0.010296 0.008771 -0.00019 0.00144 0.05497
(-0.394) (0.330) (-0.019)
E (during post-announcement -0.00029 -0.005661 -0.00013 0.00148 0.05645
and announcement period)
(-0.059) (-0.336) (-0.059)
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Chapter 6: Implication
The results of the study are contrary to the literature that indicates shareholders of 
target companies have increments in wealth due to premiums paid by bidding firms. 
In Asia, reaction of shareholders of target firms towards M&A announcement is 
negative but that of bidding firms is positive. It is indeterminate that types of 
acquisitions, modes of payment and types of target firms are major factors in 
determining CAAR of firms involved in M&A announcement. However, there are 
other factors to explain the differences.
The first factor may be rules unfavorable for M&A activities. In South Korea, for 
instance, the cross-guarantees of group members5 loans from the financial institutions 
are major concern reasons for the distribution of gains between target and bidding 
firms. The drawback of this system is that the insolvency of one company would have 
a domino effect on other member-guarantors who also bankrupt as a result. Chaebol 
is an extensive web of cross-guarantees of group members, loans from financial 
institutions. Thus, under the cross-guarantees system, M&A activities in Korea are 
mostly attributes of rescue by parent companies or financial institutions rather than 
profit maximization.
The bidding firms still obtain economies of scale, market share expansion and increase 
on their assets with lower acquiring price if M&A activities are successfully 
completed. Market expectation to bidding firms is positive, so stock prices rise and in
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turn their CAAR tends to increase. Bad performance of target firms such as profit 
dropping and rise of liability causes investors to lose confidence in holding their stock.
By the same token, target firms are lacking bargaining power to ask for good 
acquiring prices. Most of them may be forced to sell their share of the firms at an 
unfavorable price. Market expects stock prices of target firms to decrease even when 
M&A deals are successfully completed. Speculators follow the market to sell the 
stocks of target firms, so CAAR of target firms tends to decrease.
Secondly, differences in their financial system, function, regulations about M&A and 
economic foundations between western and Asian countries are plausible reasons. The 
investors concerned must consider twice before deciding whether or not to dispose of 
their shares in the face of a bid. They could not totally rely on the experience of 
companies engaged in M&A in western countries to make a decision.
Financial systems in the US and other European countries are different from that in 
most Asian countries. Relatively speaking, Americans emphasize legal and market 
mechanism but most Asian countries are concerned about long-term personal 
relationships with financial institutions and their government since financial 
institutions and government subsidies are major capital sources for companies in the 
US when they face financial problem. Therefore, M&A activities in Asian local firms 
are under government force or requests from financial institutions. The shareholders 
could not be guaranteed to gain in any M&A.
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Most importantly, some target firms trapped in financial crisis are forced to sell their 
share or control rights at unreasonably low prices in order to pay debt. In some Asian 
countries such as Japan and South Korea, firms are grouped together (known as 
keiretsu in Japan and Chaebol in South Korea), organized around a main bank, and 
linked by cross-holdings of share in order to provide financial assistance to each other. 
More strikingly, it is common that parent firms help subordinate firms through 
takeover. The parent companies buy their subsidiaries (both loan and asset) to save 
them in any financial crisis. The acquiring price offered to the target firm is far lower 
than its actual value. The loan burden of acquiring firms increases as a result of 
takeover of subsidiaries5 loans. Thus, market reaction of shareholders is negative at 
pre-announcement period.
Listed companies in the US rely on the financial market to raise capital and there are 
more legal regulations to protect shareholders interests, so the performance of 
management of listed companies is closely monitored. Firms in the US depend on the 
market to control agency and free rider problems. To some extent, interests of 
shareholders are major management consideration before launching any actions such 
as M&A.
Negative abnormal return faced by shareholders of target firms may be explained by 
the fact that target firms manipulate anti-takeover measures to defend takeover at the 
post-announcement period such as poison pills to protect their interest rather than
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shareholder interest. Target firms become less valuable. It is questionable whether 
anti-takeover devices in Asian countries are in the best interests of shareholders. 
Target firms manipulate anti-takeover amendments and other devices to protect 
management interests rather than shareholder interests. For example, the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis suggests that the barriers erected are to protect management 
jobs and that such actions work to the detriment of shareholders.
To solve conflict between shareholders and managers, severance contracts such as 
golden parachutes are used to compensate managers for their jobs losses in the event 
of a change in control. In general, contracts that award inappropriately high payments 
to excessively large group reduce efficiency and harm shareholders by raising 
acquisitions cost.
The above results indicate the possibility that some takeovers in Asia may be 
attempted by raiders who are designed ultimately to sell the target shares at a higher 
price than what the raider originally paid. It points out another possibility that 
greenmail occurred when target management ended a hostile takeover threat by 
repurchasing at a premium the hostile suitor's block of target stock. It caused 
negative publicity to target firms. Thus, target firms faced negative abnormal return 
around announcement period.
Therefore, another important implication of the study is to urge government in Asia to 
reevaluate their securities laws concerned so that the interest of shareholders could be
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protected further. Besides, result in general also illustrate that bidding firms could 
yield significantly higher returns in an acquisition in most countries. It is consistent 
with existing evidence that Jensen and Ruback (1983) found higher abnormal return in 
form of acquisition. The method of payment in the study is predominantly cash and 
most target firms are privately held. There are no significant positive average residuals 
around the date of announcement. The study finds that bidding firms acquire private 
firms in form of cash offer earning higher return when they acquired public firms. It is 
different from the findings of Chang (1998) that bidding firms experience no abnormal 
return in cash offers when the target is privately held.
The study reflects that the number of M&A announcements in form of cash offer is 
greater than that with stock exchange. This finding is consistent of that of Travlos 
and Papaioannou (1991). Most managers of acquiring firms prefer cash offer to 
stock exchange as a mode of payment in M&A because they value control avoid 
issuing stock, which dilute their ownership and increase the risk of losing control. 
Bidding firms experience higher CAAR in case of acquisitions, similar to the finding 
of Jensen and Ruback (1983).
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
The aim of study is to test whether firms involved in M&A announcements experience 
abnormal return around M&A announcement period and investigate how abnormal 
return of these firms would be influenced by types of acquisitions, modes of payment 
and types of target firms. With significantly negative average residuals for targets 
around the announcement, this study concludes that market reaction of target firms to 
takeovers in Asia is negative.
The unusual price reactions in the form of CAAR for target firms during pre­
announcement period (-2.3%), announcement period (-0.24%) and post­
announcement period (-6.8%) are negative but not statistically significant. Thus, 
there is no abnormal return on target firms at the announcement period. By contrast, 
CAAR facing shareholders of bidding firms is positive at the post-announcement 
period.
Thus, it indicates that information concerning a forthcoming corporate takeover is not 
considered good news for shareholders of target firms, as opposed to that of bidding 
firms. However, whether the results are related to poor performance of target firms 
is unknown. Further study is aspired to judge this point. The changes in share prices 
prior to the announcement or after announcement may be due to information leakage 
to the markets, profit performance of firms involved or acquiring prices different from 
market expectation. Evidence on the significantly positive changes of abnormal return
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suggests that the shareholders of bidding firms support M&A deals and expect future 
efficiency of the gains from the M&A activities.
On the other hand, the study period is not long enough, so the merger effect, if any, 
on target and bidding firms is not apparent yet. Also, almost all M&A cases in the 
sample frame occurred in the second half of 1997 and whole year of 1998. During 
that period, Asian countries faced the Asian Financial Crisis and prices of most stocks 
collapsed devastatingly. Most of sample countries selected are open to international 
market and dependent of global economic development, so most of listed firms in 
these countries face a considerably fall in their stock price. Hence, whether the result 
is biased by the financial crisis is still unknown. It is certain that the financial crisis 
causes a series of M&A activities. Some companies aim to enjoy synergy gain or 
some want to save subsidiaries that are trapped in the financial crisis.
In conclusion, the study is to provide a reference for investors about whether the firms 
concerned experience abnormal return around M&A announcements in Asia (no 
matter whether M&A activities completed or not) and how type of acquisitions, mode 
of payment and form of target firms affect abnormal return of the companies.
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Chapter 8 Limitations of the Study
This study tests the announcement effect of M&A activities and the sample is 
composed of successful and failure M&A cases. Thus, it is unable to test the impacts 
of completed M&A activities on bidding firms and target firms. The information 
about regulations on M<feA cases of countries is limited. The distribution of M&A 
cases of countries is uneven that the number of cases of some countries are small but 
other are large. Most cases fall during the Asian Financial crisis.
Besides, the mode of payment of all M&A announcements related to public target 
firms is cash, so it is impossible to test the effect of mode of payment to abnormal 
return of public target firms surrounding the M&A announcement. In our sample, it 
happens that we could only find the variable of relative size of the market value of the 
target to bidder (RMZ) data for the observations that are cash offers and related to 
public targets. Without dropping the RMZ, hypotheses 4, 5 and 7 cannot be tested. 
Thus, the effect of this control variable to the study becomes unknown.
In addition, there is a problem in using the market model. To calculate abnormal 
returns in the market model, a  and (3 are derived using return data from a period prior 
to the event. As the values of a  and P are changed due to the event, they are either 
underestimated or overestimated and thus affecting the performance of abnormal 
returns.
9 0
In the study, three sets of observation periods and event periods are set to see 
whether different lengths of observation periods cause different abnormal return. 
Hong Kong sub-sample (not the entire sample) is used for the pilot test of the three 
sets events windows. The first set is used by Brown and Warner (1985) that a 
maximum of 250 daily return observations are used for the period around the event 
starting at day t-244 and ending at day t+5. The estimation period is from trading day 
t-244 through trading day t-6, with respect to the initial acquisition announcement 
where t is an initial date of announcement equals to date 0. The following 11 days (-5 
through +5) is designated the event period.
The second is used by Mackinlay (1997) that a maximum of 292 daily return 
observations are used for the period around the event starting at day t-271 and ending 
at day t+20. The estimation period is from trading day t-271 through trading day t- 
21, with respect to the initial acquisition announcement where t is an initial date of 
announcement and equal to date 0. The following 41 days (-20 through +20) is 
designated the event period.
The third is used by Huang and Walkling (1987) that a maximum of 351 daily return 
observations are used for the period around the event starting at day t-300 and ending 
at day t+50. The estimation period is from trading day t-300 through trading day t- 
51, with respect to the initial acquisition announcement where t is an initial date of 
announcement and equal to date 0. The following 101 days (-50 through +50) is 
designated the event period.
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However, the performance of abnormal return during these event periods is similar. 
As the sample is based on merger or acquisition announcements rather than lists of 
completed acquisitions to decrease ex post selection and classification bias, it is 
impossible to identify the exact post-event date. Thus, the changes of a  and (i are 
unknown. The exclusion of the sub-sample data during and after the Asian financial 
crisis would alter results in the existing study.
Finally, there is a lack of regulation details about M&A activities in Asian countries 
but the investigation of regulations about M&A activities is not the objective of the 
study. The results on abnormal returns of bidding firms and target firms around the 
announcement period raise interesting questions. In particular, which factors affect 
abnormal returns of bidding firms and target firms around the announcement period is 
an unanswered question that deserves future research.
9 2
Appendix 1
Table 17: Results of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns of bidding firms surrounding mergers and acquisition announcements 
made between January 1990 and December 1998.
Regression A used cumulative abnormal returns during pre-announcement period as the dependent variable. Regression B used announcement-period cumulative 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression C used cumulative abnormal returns during post-announcement-period as the dependent variable. 
Regression D used pre-announcement plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression E used post-announcement 
plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable.
t-statistics were shown in parentheses. The number of observations was 558 for all regressions. Market size of bidding firms at announcement date was 
calculated by the product of number of outstanding share and closing price at announcement date________________________________________________
Regression In te r c e p t Coefficient of D\ :Type of 
Acquisition
(P丨）
Coefficient of relative 
size of the market 
value of the target to 
bidder ((34)
Coefficient of 






A (during pre-announcement period) .860158 -.292163 -.002725 .046343 .03342 1.61039
(1 .6346) (-1 .279) (-.589) (.256)
B(during announcement period) .029620 -.018990 .002188 -.070228 -.01447 .62431
(.650) (-.410) (1 .309) (-.107)
C (during post-announcement period) .389778 -.311154 -.053694 .039320 .01774 1.47566
(1.621 ) (-1 .192) (-.100) ( .1 8 7 )
D(during pre-announcement plus -.021279 .070760 -.005579 .025443 -.03041 .22286
announcement period)
(-.104) (.341) (-.745) (.087)
E (during post-announcement plus -.040788 .088855 -.006961 .021907 -.02580 .33766
announcement period)
(-.198) (.424) (-.921) (.074)
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Regression A used cumulative abnormal returns during pre-announcement period as the dependent variable. Regression B used announcement-period cumulative 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression C used cumulative abnormal returns during post-announcement-period as the dependent variable. 
Regression D used pre-announcement plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression E used post-announcement 
plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable.
t-statistics were shown in parentheses. The number of observations was 123 for all regressions. Market size of bidding firms at announcement date was 
calculated by the product of number of outstanding share and closing price at announcement date
Table 18: Results o f regressions of cumulative abnormal returns of ta rg e t firms shareholders surrounding mergers and acquisition
announcements made between January 1990 and December 1998.
Regression Intercept Coefficient of Type of 
Acquisition (入，）
Coefficient of relative size of 
the market value of the target 
to bidder (A,4)
Coefficient of 






A (during pre-announcement -.015257 .003821 '003687 .024742 -.03234 .20640
period) (-.364) (.072) ('6 3 5  ) (.443 )
B(during announcement .003980 -.004947 -.001542 -.011293 -.01693 .57282
period) (.396) (-.390) (-1.109) (-.084)
C (during post-announcement -.022335 '089502 .013982 -.084819 .01474 1.37902
period) (-.408) (-1.291) (1.845)* (-.116)
D(during pre-announcement '021279 .070760 -.005579 .025443 -.03041 .22286
and announcement period)
(-.104) (.341) (-.745 ) (.087 )
E (during post-announcement -.040788 .088855 -.006961 .021907 -.02580 .33766
and announcement period)
(-.198) (.424) (-.921) (.074)
and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively.
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Regression A used cumulative abnormal returns during pre-announcement period as the dependent variable. Regression B used announcement-period cumulative 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression C used cumulative abnormal returns during post-announcement-period as the dependent variable. 
Regression D used pre-announcement plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression E used post-announcement 
plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable.
t-statistics were shown in parentheses. The number of observations was 123 for all regressions. Market size of bidding firms at announcement date was 
calculated by the product of number of outstanding share and closing price at announcement date
T able 19: T h e resu lts o f  G en era lized  L east Square (G L S ) m eth od  for tab le 18
Regression In te r c e p t Coefficient of
Type of Acquisition (A，i)
Coefficient of relative size of the 
market value of the target to bidder 
(入4)
Coefficient of 






A (during pre-announcement .256 -.004917 -0 .00706 .001239 .026 1.336
period) (8 .661) ( -1 .2 2 2 )
V IF=0.23
( - .9 8 2 )  
V IF =0.85
( .0 0 6 2 )  
V IF =0.333
B(during announcement .005828 .001632 -.003153 0 -.0032 1.421






C  (during post-announcement -.05585 -.288 .02177 0 ■0114 2 .630
period) (-.572) (-1 .477)
V IF=1.051






0263 .02183 -.01138 0 -.003 1.05
(7 .548) (.464) (-1 .405  ) ( 〇 )
V 1F=1.186 V IF =1.017 V IF =1.174
E (during post-announcement .527 -.0486 .03983 0 0.521 1.5483
and announcement period)
(8 .832) (-.6311) (4 .817***) (〇 )
V IF =1.206 V IF= 1.033 V IF =1.188
***, ** and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively. 
VIF=Variance-inflation factor
The problem of multicollinearity is not obvious as the values of VIF do not exceed 10.
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Generalized Least Square (GLS) method: A factor extraction method that minimizes the sum of the squared differences between the observed and reproduced 
correlation matrices. Correlations are weighted by the inverse of their uniqueness, so that variables with high uniqueness are given less weight than those with 
low uniqueness.
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T a b le  20: R esu lts o f  reg ress io n s o f  cu m u la tiv e  abnorm al returns o f  ta r g e t  Firms shareholders surround ing  m ergers and  acq u isition  a n n o u n cem en ts m ade betw een
January 19 9 0  and D ecem b er 1998 .
Regression A used cumulative abnormal returns during pre-announcement period as the dependent variable. Regression B used announcement-period cumulative 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression C used cumulative abnormal returns during post-announcement-period as the dependent variable. 
Regression D used pre-announcement plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Regression E used post-announcement 
plus announcement period cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable.
t-statistics were shown in parentheses. The number of observations was 123 for all regressions. Market size of bidding firms at announcement date was 
calculated by the product of number of outstanding share and closing price at announcement date
Regression Intercept Coefficient of Type of 
Acquisition (k \)
Coefficient of relative size of 





A (during pre-announcement -.011272 .003656 -.003730 -.02113 .21385
period) (-.277) (.069) (-.646)
B(during announcement .003798 -.004938 -.001540 -.00346 .86715
period) (.390) (-.392) (-1.116)
C (during post-announcement -.023701 -.089446 .013997 .02787 1.67902
period) (-.446) (-1.299) (1.860)*
D(during pre-announcement -.007473 -.001223 -.005273 -.01686 .36981
and announcement period)
(-.166) (-.0 2 1 ) (-.825)
E (during post-announcement -.019903 -.094324 -.012454 .02061 1.59978
and announcement period)
(-.370) (-1.352) (-1.634)
and * denote statistical significance in 2-tailed test at 1%, 5%  and 10% levels respectively.
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Relative size of the market 
value of the target to bidder Market size of bidding firms
CAR during Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.2946 0.9867 ■0.1322 -0.4363 ■0.0799 0.0111
pre-announcement period Sî . (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 3.0016 0.0000 0.4809 0.7920
CAR during Pearson Correlation 0.2946 1.0000 0.4463 -0.0815 -0.3793 0.1472 0.0236
announcement period Sip. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 3.0523 D.0000 0.1926 0.5763
CAR during Pearson Correlation 0.9867 0.4463 1.0000 -0.1377 ■0.4732 ■0.0244 0.0144
post-announcement period Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.8302 0.7321
CAR during pre-announcement Pearson Correlation -0.1322 ■0.0815 -0.1377 1.0000 0.0109 -0.0840 0.0037
plus announcement period Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0016 0.0523 0.0010 0.7963 0.4589 0.9295
CAR during post-announcement Pearson Correlation -0.4363 ■0.3793 -0.4732 0.0109 1.0000 -0.1034 -0.0102
plus announcement period Si只.（2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7963 0.3615 0.8089
Relative size of the market Pearson Correlation -0.0799 0.1472 ■0.0244 -0.0840 -0.1034 1.0000 -0.0618
value of the target to bidder Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4809 0.1926 0.8302 0.4589 0.3615 0.5858
Market size of bidding firms Pearson Correlation o . o m 0.0236 0.0144 0.0037 -0.0102 ■0.0618 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7920 0.5763 0.7321 0.9295 0.8089 0.5858
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of the market value of 
the target to bidder




Correlation 1.0000 0.2418 0.1168 0.9796 0.1540 ■0.0754 0.0513
pre-announcement period Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0182 0.2598 0.0000 0.1362 3.5147 0.6218
CAR during
Pearson
Correlation 0.2418 1.0000 0.1135 0.4317 0.2800 -0.1435 0.0156
announcement period Sifi. (2-tailed) 0.0182 0.2733 0.0000 0.0060 0.2100 0.8798
CAR during
Pearson
Correlation 0.1168 0.1135 1.0000 0.1320 0.9856 0.1785 ■0.0343




Correlation 0.9796 0.4317 0.1320 1.0000 0.2011 ■0.0994 0.0509




Correlation 0.1540 0.2800 0.9856 0.2011 1.0000 0.1511 -0.0305
plus announcement period Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1362 0.0060 0.0000 0.0507 0.1897 0.7695
Relative size of the market
Pearson
Correlation -0.0754 -0.1435 0.1785 -0.0994 0.1511 1.0000 ■0.0191
value of the target to bidder Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5147 0.2100 0.1203 0.3895 0.1897 0.8681
Market size of bidding firms
Pearson
Correlation 0.0513 0.0156 -0.0343 0.0509 -0.0305 -0.0191 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6218 0.8798 0.7416 0.6243 0.7695 0.8681
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Table 23 Characteristics of Bidding Firms by Industry
Industry H ong K ong T aiw an Japan S ingap ore C hina South K orea
Basic metal industries 0 2 0 0 0 9
Construction 0 6 0 0 0 0
Consolidated 59 9 10 71 4 10
Electronics 0 16 0 0 0 0
Finance 4 3 20 8 0 40
Hotels 4 0 0 12 0 0
Insurance 0 0 3 0 0 8
Manufacturer of chemical, petroleum, coal 0 0 0 0 2 9
Manufacturer of fabricated metal product 0 0 0 0 0 25
Manufacturer of foods and beverages 0 1 0 0 2 2
Manufacturer of non-metallic mineral product 0 0 0 0 0 12
Others 40 13 3 15 3 8
Plastics 0 5 0 0 3 0
Paper printing and publishing industries 0 0 0 0 0 13
Properties 31 19 0 27 0 0
Retail trade 0 0 0 0 0 9
Textile, wearing apparel and leather industry 0 0 0 0 2 3
Transport and storage 0 3 0 0 2 0
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 2
Wholesale trade 4 0 0 0 0 2
Total 142 77 36 133 18 152
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Table 24 Characteristics o f Target Firms by Industry
Industry H ong K ong T aiw an Japan S in gap ore C hina South K orea
Basic metal industries 0 0 0 0 0 2
Construction 0 4 0 0 0 0
Consolidated 3 8 3 6 0 8
Electronics 0 11 0 0 0 0
Finance 1 2 1 4 0 9
Hotels 2 0 0 2 0 0
Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 3
Manufacturer of chemical, petroleum, coal 0 0 0 0 0 2
Manufacturer of fabricated metal product 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manufacturer of foods and beverages 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manufacturer of non-metallic mineral product 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 2 17 1 4 0 5
Plastics 0 4 0 0 0 0
Paper printing and publishing industries 0 0 0 0 0 0
Properties 0 14 0 2 0 0
Retail trade 0 0 0 0 0 0
Textile, wearing apparel and leather industry 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transport and storage 0 3 0 0 0 0
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wholesale trade 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 8 63 5 18 0 29
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